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The eradication of child labour will enhance human capital development and pro-
vide a means for sustainable development for the affected countries. However,
child labour has persisted despite a significant reduction in monetary poverty in
sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis uses econometric techniques to answer three re-
search questions on why the problem persists. First, I study the effect of changes
in food prices on child labour. In the second empirical chapter, the thesis exam-
ines how agricultural subsidies affect child labour. This chapter is motivated by
the widespread use of input subsidies to mitigate the effects of higher food prices
on households. The last empirical chapter analyses the effect of relative depriva-
tion on child labour. That chapter extends earlier findings that changes in food
prices and the distribution of subsidised inputs affect subjective well-being. The
main findings of the study are: (i) an increase in food prices leads to an increase
in child labour. (ii) child labour is higher among households which benefit from
the subsidised inputs, and (iii) relatively deprived households are more likely to
engage in child labour. In addition, the study further notes heterogeneities in
the observed effects regarding household characteristics. For instance, changes in
food prices have lower effect among landowning households. Also, children living
in small-scale farm households are more affected by the subsidised inputs than
those in large-scale farm households. These results mean that both economic
shocks and governments’ policies may explain why the problem has persisted in
the sub-region. Based on the findings, the study recommends that policymakers
should include labour-saving technologies to the productivity-enhancing inputs to
reduce the unintended impact of the programme on child labour. Policy interven-
tions should also consider the heterogeneity of the effects of food price shocks in
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A child’s access to good health, education, and a secured childhood is an inalien-
able right that goes beyond moral or social imperative, it is a strategic means
to achieve sustainable economic growth and development (UNICEF, 2016). But,
child labour denies a significant proportion of the world’s children this right. Most
of the affected children live in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where poverty
is prevalent. Sometimes the deprivations faced by these children manifest in the
form of working under hazardous conditions, which not only affect their human
capital development but also the economic growth and sustainability of their
respective countries.
Because of its effect on long-term economic growth, the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals states the elimination of child labour as an explicit goal (UN, 2016;
USDOL, 2016). The topic has also generated a lot of attention among develop-
ment practitioners and economists. Referring to the outcome of the Fourth Global
Conference on the Eradication of Child Labour, where governments pledged to
take immediate action towards eradicating child labour in all its forms by 2025,
Kailash Satyarthi1, calls on the UN, through its major agencies to bring child
labour within the context of sustainable development (The Hindu Business Online,
2017). Despite the efforts and resources that stakeholders have put into eradi-
cating the menace, a significant proportion of children, worldwide, are engaged in




child labour. In SSA, about 20 percent of the children are active labourers (US-
DOL, 2015). Most of these children work on cocoa, coffee, tea, tobacco and
sugarcane plantations as paid and unpaid family workers, whilst others engage
in other dangerous commercial activities such as street hawking, commercial sex
trade, and small-scale mining.
In some poor households, income from child labour makes up a significant
proportion of household earnings, without which their consumption falls below
subsistence (Basu & Van, 1998; Koomson & Asongu, 2016). For these households,
child labour provides an important buffer against unfavourable shocks such as bad
weather (Bandara, Dehejia, & Lavie-Rouse, 2015), death or sickness of a household
member, and a poor harvest. Child labour also serves as a coping strategy, albeit
one with negative consequences (ILO, 2017a).
In spite of the significance of absolute poverty as a determinant of child
labour, a large percentage of children are engaged in economic activities in de-
veloping countries even though there has been an appreciable economic growth,
and a significant reduction in poverty in these countries (Dwibedi & Marjit, 2017;
Sarkar & Sarkar, 2015). This raises questions about the notion of poverty as the
key determinant of child labour (Basu & Van, 1998). Following Bhalotra and
Heady (2003), other empirical studies failed to find support for the luxury axiom
of child labour (R. Ray, 2000). For example, Kruger (2007) found that a higher
income leads to an increase in child labour in Brazil. Even though adherents of
the luxury axiom have used the ‘wealth-paradox’ to explain contrary findings,
not all, as noted by Dwibedi and Marjit (2017), of the contrary results can be
explained by the wealth-paradox.
In a survey of studies on the determinant of child labour, Bhalotra and
Tzannatos (2003) found, in most of the papers, a small and often insignificant
correlation between household poverty level (proxied by income or expenditure)
and child labour. In Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Zambia, Canagarajah and Nielsen
(2001; 1999) suggest that there is not enough evidence to conclude that poverty
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is more important than other factors like transportation and education costs in
determining child labour. Hence, there is the need to understand the causes of
the problem beyond the poverty hypothesis.
Because child labour destroys lives, decimates communities, and under-
mines a country’s potential for economic development more efforts are being made
at both local and international levels to curb the problem. Whilst there has been
progress in reducing child labour over the years, the prevalence of economic and
natural shocks continues to pose a threat to the successful eradication of child
labour. Adverse shocks like food price hikes and natural disasters affect both the
income and expenditure of poor households in developing countries. Without ac-
cess to sufficient mitigating and coping strategies, poor households, the landless
may rely on child labour to ensure subsistence when they adverse shocks affect
them.
Studies have examined the relationship between economic growth and child
labour (Grootaert & Patrinos, 2000; Kambhampati & Rajan, 2006; Swaminathan,
1998). In one of these studies, Kambhampati and Rajan (2006) find an inverted
‘U’ relationship between economic growth and child labour. In their conclusion,
they state extreme poverty at the initial stages of the economic growth process as
the cause of child labour. The reasons for such a non-linear relationship, accord-
ing to different studies include the need for a ‘supple’ hand which could adapt
to new machinery (Marx, 1867, p. 372), the widened employment opportunities
(Heywood, 2002), and the household’s access to more livelihood options (Horrell
& Humphries, 1995). There is, hardly, any study on this relationship using an
African data set. However, some recent agricultural policy interventions (for ex-
ample, the provision of subsidized inputs to farmers) make it imperative to study
how efforts to induce economic growth by increasing agricultural productivity may
affect child labour on the continent.
Since most people in developing countries earn their livelihood from agricul-
ture, we need to understand the role of agricultural development and agriculture-
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related shocks in the demand and supply of child labour. Changes in food prices,
for instance, presents both opportunities and challenges to smallholder farm house-
holds. These opportunities and challenges could affect child labour depending on
the socio-economic circumstances of the household. In Pakistan and Uganda,
studies have shown that higher food prices affect the poverty status of the house-
hold, and this leads to a higher incidence of child labour (Frempong & Stadelmann,
2018; Hou, Hong, & Scott, 2015). Even if higher food prices increased the house-
hold’s income, there is still the likelihood that child labour would increase because
the household may have to increase its own labour including that of children to
increase output.
Governments adopt different policies to mitigate the effects of unexpected
price shocks on the household. For instance, during the 2008 and 2010 episodes
of higher food prices, several countries in Africa (for example, Ghana, Kenya
Malawi, Nigeria and, Zambia) provided subsidized inputs to small-scale farmers
to increase national food supply and the incomes of the farmers. In line with
mainstream economic theories on child labour, one may expect an increase in
household income, because of the policies, to reduce child labour and increase
school enrolment. However, it is also possible for the policies to cause child labour.
The nature of program design and implementation, the imperfect nature of the
agricultural labour market, and land tenure systems are some of the reasons child
labour may increase because of these subsidies.
The subject of child labour has generated a lot of research interest in the
social sciences. However, the multifaceted nature of it, regarding its inter-linkages
with the socio-cultural circumstances of the household, has led to little consensus
in the literature. Well-understood subjects like the effect of household income
and wealth on child labour are still under contention (Bhalotra & Heady, 2003;
Canagarajah, Newman, & Bhattamishra, 2001; Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997;
D. Ray, 2006). In addition, subjects like the effect of subjective well-being on
child labour remains under-researched in economics. It is in the light of this lack
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of consensus that I seek to explore how some recent developments in the sub-region
have affected child labour.
1.2. Motivation of the Study
The multifaceted nature of child labour makes it one of the active research areas
in development economics. However, as new local and international economic
developments introduce different dynamics, there is a continuous need for more
insights into the problem. In addition, different countries are presented with
different challenges to child labour from the same or similar economic shocks. For
instance, the effect of higher prices on child labour in a food-sufficient country
would differ from that of a net-food importer, this also holds at the household
level. Thus, while we may extract from the available theoretical and empirical
literature a general understanding of the problem, for an efficient policy targeting,
it is important to gain a deeper understanding of the heterogeneous nature of the
problem regarding the constraints, incentives, and agencies that cause it.
Target 8.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals demands of the interna-
tional community to ‘[t]ake immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced
labour, and modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and
elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of
child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms’. Current child labour
estimates show that, even though the world has made real progress towards the
eradication of the problem, a significant proportion of children are engaged in child
labour, and some work under hazardous conditions. According to ILO (2017b),
about 19.6 and 8.6 percent of children in Africa alone are engaged in child labour
and hazardous work. This makes Africa the continent with the highest incidence
of child labour. The report further states that compared to the earlier periods,
the pace of progress slowed down between 2012 and 2016.
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The persistence of child labour calls for more insight into the underlying
causes of the problem. This study examines the impact of recent economic shocks
and policies on child labour in Africa. I examine the impacts of changes in food
prices (Chapter 2) and agricultural input subsidy (Chapter 3) on child labour. The
topics are chosen to show how both economic shocks and policy responses (if not
carefully implemented) can have re-enforcing effects to increase child labour. The
chapters contribute to the broader discussion on the ‘constraints’ and ‘incentives’
that cause child labour. The work further demonstrates how a non-pecuniary
factor, subjective well-being, affects child labour (Chapter 4).
This dissertation is an extract from my broader research activities, which
besides what is presented in this thesis, have examined the effect of women’s
bargaining power on child labour (Frempong & Stadelmann, 2017), the role of
crop diversity2, and access to secured markets (Novignon, Frempong, & Afoakwah,
2017)3, and agricultural input subsidy on household welfare and nutrition4.
The findings from these studies point to the multifaceted nature of the
problem. In one of these studies, I find evidence that supports the traditional
notions that adverse economic shocks are important determinants of child labour.
Some of the papers also provide new insights on how contemporary events could
affect child labour. For instance, one study shows that good agricultural policy
interventions present opportunities for poverty reduction (Novignon et al., 2017),
and by extension child labour. But such programmes could worsen the child
labour situation (Chapter 3).
2 An ongoing research with Elena Groß.
3 Funded by the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) and the World Food Pro-
gramme to assess the impact of WFP’s Purchase for Progress Program.
4 Novignon, J., Chirwa G.C., & Frempong R.B. (2017). Agricultural input subsidies, food
price shocks and malnutrition in Malawi. A work-in-progress funded by the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation (BMGF) through the AERC as part of AERC’s thematic research on
evaluating the impact of agricultural and food policies on nutritional outcomes in SSA.
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1.3. Some Concepts and Conventions on Child
Labour
The child labour literature is characterised by arguments and counterarguments
concerning definitions and measurements of the various aspects of the problem.
Since there is limited consensus regarding several key indicators, much is left for
the researcher to decide in an empirical study of this nature. The aims of this
section are to (i) situate the study in the broader discussions on child labour, and
(ii) provide the bases for the definitions and measures adopted in the subsequent
chapters of the thesis.
There seems to be an agreement on the adverse effects of child labour, how-
ever, there is no consensus on what constitutes child labour (IPEC & Edmonds,
2009; Satz, 2003). Broadly, child labour may refer to the child’s engagement in
an activity that may be harmful or hazardous to her (IPEC & Edmonds, 2009).
Embedded in this definition are the questions: who is a child? and what makes
up a harmful work? Through the ILO’s Statistical Information and Monitoring
Program on Child Labour (SIMPOC) and the United Nations Convention of the
Rights of the Child (UN-CRC), countries are converging towards a uniform def-
inition of a child as a person below 18 years. This notwithstanding, there is no
general agreement regarding what constitutes a harmful activity. For empirical
studies and statistical computation, the definition of child labour becomes prob-
lematic because national surveys rarely contain information on the alternative
uses of the child time in the absence of work, that is, there is a lack of a counter-
factual evidence (IPEC & Edmonds, 2009). This has led to different definitions
of child labour in empirical and theoretical research (IPEC & Edmonds, 2009, see
Table 3).
One way to look at the question of harmfulness is to consider the problem
from the perspective of Sen (1985, 2001), where a harmful activity may be defined
as any engagement that limits or hampers the child’s welfare and agency interests.
7
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Here, welfare interest refers to the child’s general good, whilst agency interest
refers to her ability to meaninfully take part in matters concerning her overall
welfare either in the present period or in the future (Satz, 2003).
In operationalising the interests of the child, Article 32 (1) of the UN-CRC
states that: State parties recognize the right of the child (below the age of eighteen
years) to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work
that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to
be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social
development. The ILO further caters for national differences with regards to
what constitutes an economic exploitation and harmful work by allowing member
countries, depending on their economy and educational facilities, to specify a
minimum age of 14 years. These notwithstanding, the ILO-SIMOPOC uses the
following criteria in international child labour statistics:
i. A child under 12 who is economically active for 1 or more hours per week,
ii. A child 14 and under who is economically active for at least 14 hours per
week,
iii. A child 17 and under who is economically active for at least 43 hours per week
iv. A child 17 and under who participates in activities that are "hazardous by
nature or circumstance" for 1 or more hours per week
v. A child 17 and under who participates in an ‘unconditional worst form of
child labour’ such as trafficked children, children in bondage or forced labour,
armed conflict, prostitution, pornography, and illicit activities.
As an empirical work, this thesis adopts definitions which reflect both
international conventions and domestic laws on child labour in the respective case
countries. Traditional norms also inform how I measure the child labour variable.
Because of these, the results of the thesis are relevant for policies at the local level
and are also comparable across countries for generalisation.
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Equally contentious is what we must do to eradicate the problem. A strong
policy implication of Basu and Tzannatos (2003) is that stopping child labour can
put the household in a good equilibrium. The basis of this conclusion is the
assumption that a total ban on child labour will increase adult wage, and if the
new wage is above subsistence level, then households will cease to supply child
labour (Bhalotra, 2003). In addition, we could also expect a legal ban to increase
the cost of hiring child labour, hence reducing employers’ incentive to use them.
One argument against such a ban is that it may cause households to choose worse
options for their children (Satz, 2003). Basu and Van (1998) also argue that
if households send their children to work out of desperation from poverty, then
the case for a total ban on child labour is weakened. Because these parents are
compelled to send their children to work for survival. Hence, such a ban may
not necessarily enhance the welfare of the child. Bharadwaj, Lakdawala, and Li
(2013) show that child wages decreased, and child labour increased after India’s
Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986. Thus, the evidence, so
far, shows that if care is not taken, the attempt to reduce child labour through a
legal ban may rather worsen the situation of child labour in developing countries.
1.4. Non-technical Summary of the Main Find-
ings
The section presents the main findings of the three empirical chapters of the thesis
in the form of a non-technical summary.
Chapter 2
A significant proportion of the population in developing countries are small-scale
farmers who, because of low output and lack of adequate storage facilities, depend
on market purchases to supplement their own production for domestic consump-
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tion. Most of these people are net food buyers who spend a significant proportion
of their incomes on food. Depending on the level of their net market status, they
could become more vulnerable when food prices rise. However, higher food prices
could also present an opportunity for those who have marketable surplus. But
even for this group of households, their ability to take advantage of the higher
food prices depend on such factors as land ownership and size, access to credit
and capital, and the available agricultural labour market. Therefore, irrespec-
tive of the circumstance, higher food prices present real challenges to agricultural
households. The situation becomes more pronounced when the increase in prices is
global. Because this hampers the ability of domestic governments and importers
to supplement domestic production with imports.
For a large part of 2008 through to 2010, global food prices, (especially
that of cereal staples like maize, wheat, and rice) increased to a crisis level. In
2008 international food prices hit a 30-year high, the FAO’s international food
price index increased by 76 percent over the 2006 level and 40 percent from
2007 (FAO, 2009). This affected domestic food prices with a resultant economic,
political and social unrest in several parts of the world (FAO, 2009; World Bank,
2010). Sub-Saharan Africa, where a significant proportion of the population are
poor net food buyers, was among the regions that experienced the hardest hit of
high food prices. The rising cost of food slowed the pace of poverty reduction
(Hou et al., 2015) and plunged several households below the poverty line. Among
development economists and practitioners there have been concerns about the
effect of the high food prices on child labour.
Chapter 2 of the thesis examines the effect of increased food prices on child
labour in SSA. The chapter dwells on previous studies on food prices and poverty
(Ivanic & Martin, 2008; Ivanic, Martin, & Zaman, 2012) and food prices and child
labour (Bibi, Cockburn, Coulibaly, & Tiberti, 2010; Hou et al., 2015) to further
investigate nuanced issues like the role of land ownership, net-market status in
the relationship between higher food prices and child labour. The study finds
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that, even in a food-secured country like Uganda, higher food prices may increase
both the incidence (the probability) and the intensity (the number of work hours)
of child labour. In addition, the study finds a smaller effect among landowning
households. This is consistent with the view that landowning households can bet-
ter compensate for price shocks. From the endogenous growth models, one can
expect the negative effects of child labour on health and human capital develop-
ment to influence economic growth in SSA.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 argues that because of the general agricultural factor market failures,
in rural Africa (B. Dillon & Barrett, 2017), and the low level of mechanisation
among small-scale farmers in SSA, an agricultural input subsidy could have an
unintended impact on child labour on the continent. This is because when output
increase because of the inputs, an agricultural household must fall on its own
members to provide additional labour. Children may be used in such activities
as land preparation, fertiliser application, harvesting, and disposal. Even if these
children are not directly employed on farms, they may perform additional chores
so that adult members can work longer on the farm.
As a response to the persistent low food production and higher food prices
in the sub-region, several African countries (Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria and,
Zambia) started variants of agricultural input subsidy programs. These programs
aim to increase food production and reduce poverty among small-scale farmers.
Governments have spent huge sums of money on them, and they have achieved
varying degrees of success. The programmes may achieve the immediate aims of
increased food production and reduced poverty, but the process of achieving them
might increase child labour in the sub-region. If this is true, then the poverty-
reducing effect of the subsidies may not be sustainable. However, despite the
potential impact of the subsidies on child labour, there is no empirical study that
has examined this relationship.
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Chapter 2, therefore, contributes to filling this knowledge gap by analysing
the impact of farm input subsidies on child labour using data fromMalawi. Malawi
has a long history of input subsidisation, and in recent times, the country has
implemented one of the most successful agricultural subsidy programmes in the
sub-region. In this study, I analyse three rounds of Malawi’s Integrated Household
Panel Survey which contains detailed information on household and their members
social and economic characteristics. The results suggest that children (from 5
to 13 years) in maize-farming households that received the subsidised fertilisers
and improved maize seed are more likely to engage in child labour. The affected
children, sometimes, apply and fertiliser and prepare land for cropping.
Chapter 4
If there is any consensus in the child-labour discourse, it is on the fact that poverty
is the primary cause of the problem. By poverty, researchers in the field refer to
pecuniary absolute poverty. Flowing from this argument is the expectation that
child labour should fall with an increase in income. However, even though mone-
tary poverty has declined in some developing countries, the available evidence does
not support the income-child-labour hypothesis (Kruger, 2007; Sarkar & Sarkar,
2015). The persistence of child labour in the face of lower poverty calls more
research to enhance our understanding of the causes of the phenomenon. Getting
the causes of child labour right is a significant step towards appropriate policies
to fight it. It is therefore important to identify the right constraints, incentives
and agencies that underlie the problem.
The subject of an alternative non-monetary causes of child labour is an
active research area (Dwibedi & Marjit, 2017; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2015). Chapter
4 of the thesis contributes to this discussion by examining the role of subjective
welfare in child labour. This chapter draws on the findings that the household’s
subjective welfare affects its happiness and decisions concerning labour and re-
source allocation (Dwibedi & Marjit, 2017; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2008; Ravallion
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& Lokshin, 2010). A corollary of these findings is that the household may re-
spond to the perceived difference between their consumption levels and that of
their neighbours by reallocating resources in a way that optimises its welfare. I
argue that because income from child labour is a significant proportion of the
incomes of some poor households (Koomson & Asongu, 2016), relative depriva-
tion could increase child labour. The main finding of this chapter is that children
from subjectively deprived households are more likely to engage in child labour.
This may be a rational response the household increase its income to match its
material consumption to that of the average consumption in the neighbourhood.
1.5. Notes to the Reader
The thesis analyses three causes of child labour in SSA using individual micro
data. The study is designed so that each chapter builds on certain findings of
the others, and all the chapters, together, contribute to the broader discussions
in the child labour literature. However, each individual empirical chapter stands
alone in an article-like paper, hence they could be read independently of the each
other. Different versions of the papers in chapters 2-4 have been presented at both
local and international conferences including the Centre for the Study of African
Economies conference in Oxford and the International Conference on Shocks and
Development in Dresden. A version of Chapter 2 is published in the Journal
of Development Studies (“The Effect of Food Price Changes on Child Labour:
Evidence from Uganda”, https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2018.1448066)5.
5 Co-authored with David Stadelmann
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on Child Labour1
1 A modified version of this chapter has been jointly published with David Stadelmann in
the Journal of Development Studies as ‘The Effect of Food Price Changes on Child Labour:
Evidence from Uganda’, https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2018.1448066.
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Abstract
A majority of the people in developing countries spend about 60 percent of their
income on food, even though most of them are farmers. Hence a change in food
prices affects both their revenue and expenditure and thereby their labour de-
cision. Using the Uganda National Panel Survey and monthly food prices, this
chapter examines the effect of exogenous changes in food prices on child labour.
The econometric evidence shows that an increase in food prices leads to an in-
crease in the probability and intensity of child labour in Uganda. We also find the
effect to be smaller among landowning households, which is consistent with the
view that landowning households can better compensate for food price shocks.
The evidence suggests that periodic shocks in food prices may have longer lasting
effect on human capital development and poverty of poor households in developing
countries because of its effect on child labour.
Key words: Child labour; Exogenous shock; Food price; Uganda.
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2.1. Introduction
In 2012, over 168 million children were engaged in child labour, corresponding
to about 11 percent of children worldwide according to the International labour
Organization (ILO, 2015).2 A significant number of child labourers are employed
in sub-Saharan Africa which also has the highest incidence rate of more than
20 percent (USDOL, 2015). Generally, extreme poverty is often seen as a leading
determinant of child labour (see, e.g. Basu & Van, 1998; Carpio, Loayza, & Wada,
2016; Dessy & Pallage, 2001; de Carvalho Filho, 2012; Edmonds, 2005; Hazan &
Berdugo, 2002) and adverse income shocks affect child labour (see Beegle, Dehejia,
& Gatti, 2006; Bandara et al., 2015; Hou et al., 2015).
As food expenditure constitutes between 40 to 60 percent of the income
of the poor in developing countries (Hallegatte, Fay, Bangalore, Kane, & Bon-
zanigo, 2015; Lee et al., 2013), an increase in food prices may affect real poverty
and, thus, the incidence of child labour. However, developing countries are also
characterized by a high fraction of agricultural households which could potentially
benefit from an increase in food prices (World Bank, 2007). Hence, the effect of
a food price increase on child labour is, essentially, an empirical question.3 The
chapter contributes to analysing the effects of exogenous food price changes on
the probability and intensity of child labour with an individual-level panel data
from Uganda from 2009 to 2012.
Identifying the causes of child labour is highly relevant, particularly, for
most African countries due to its long-term impact on economic development.
Child labour is not only a relevant indicator of the current well-being of the
child but it also determines her future income and vulnerability in numerous
dimensions (Baland & Robinson, 2000; Horowitz & Trivitt, 2007; ILO, 2015).
These children risk adverse effects on their health, safety and mental development,
2 The ILO (2015) puts the number of children in hazardous work at 85 million.
3 Experience from a recent price boom of quinoa suggests that the welfare effect of rising
food prices depends on the ability of small-scale farmers to respond competitively (see The
Economist, May 21, 2016.
16
potentially leading to lower educational achievements and human capital (Baland
& Robinson, 2000; Emerson, Ponczek, & Souza, 2017).
The main empirical results of our study suggest a positive impact of an
increase in food prices on both the incidence and the intensity of child labour. A 10
percent increase in food prices leads to a 12 percent higher likelihood that children
have to work. This effect is found to be smaller among land-owning households,
this is consistent with the view that land ownership is a relevant mitigating factor
against adverse shocks. Nevertheless, we also show that, on average, land owning
households cannot fully compensate for the increase in expenditure due to higher
food prices. We tackle potential endogeneity problems by including a number
of relevant time-variant household control variables, individual fixed-effects, and
we employ international food prices changes as instruments to identify exogenous
variations in regional domestic prices. An array of robustness checks support our
main findings.
The chapter proceeds with a review of the literature in Section 2.2. Section
2.3 discusses our data and methodology. In Section 2.4, we present our main
findings, along with robustness checks whilst Section 2.5 concludes the study.
2.2. Literature Review
This study contributes to the literature which analyses the effects of adverse
economic shocks on household decision-making with a particular emphasis child
labour.
Theoretical studies often model parents as altruistic agents who would
keep their children out of work as long as the income level of the household is
high enough (Basu & Tzannatos, 2003; Basu & Van, 1998).4 Thus, parents derive
dis-utility from child labour and would want to minimize it, unless they are com-
pelled by adverse economic circumstances to generate additional income. There
4 Technically, household decision-makers consider the leisure and education of their children
as luxury goods in these models.
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is evidence which provides support for these theoretical models (Edmonds, 2005;
Grootaert & Patrinos, 2002; 2000). More importantly, independent of the precise
reasons why parents decide to send their children to work, empirical studies clearly
indicate that unfavourable production, health and economic shocks increase the
probability of child labour (Beegle et al., 2006; Bandara et al., 2015; Hou et al.,
2015).
The literature is replete with finding of how production and economic
shocks affect child labour. For example, in Tanzania, both Bandara et al. (2015)
and Beegle et al. (2006) estimate a significant and an increasing effect of agricul-
tural shocks on child work hours. Bandara et al. (2015) further notes that note
that crop shocks, especially, reduce school attendance and increase child labour.
A similar conclusion was reached by (A. Dillon, 2012), who also find, among chil-
dren in Mali, that the probability of child labour increases by as high as 24 percent
when a production shock occurs. As pointed out by some of these studies, the
magnitude of the impact depends on factors such as landholding and access to
credit (Bandara et al., 2015).
Adult and child labour are usually modelled as substitutes, where produc-
tivity of child labour is assumed to be relatively smaller than adult labour (Basu
& Tzannatos, 2003; IPEC, 2007).5 As adverse economic shocks in developing
countries may require households to expand their income-generating activities,
there will be a higher incentive to employ its own labour, including child labour
(Bandara et al., 2015; Beegle et al., 2006). We contribute to the literature on
child labour by investigating the effects of an exogenous increase in food prices
on the household’s child labour decision. If higher food prices push households
into poverty, then child labour may, therefore, be expected. At the same time,
higher food prices may also provide additional means for food-supplying house-
holds in developing countries to increase their incomes, thus alleviating poverty
5 Proponents of this assumption argue that adults are better skilled than children. However,
because adult wages are relatively higher than that of children, firms may use both factors
(see Levison, Anker, and Barage (1998)).
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rather than increasing it and this may reduce the incidence of child labour.
Following the 2008 and 2010 episodes of food price hikes, a number of stud-
ies have examined the relationship between changing food prices and indicators
of household welfare (Bibi et al., 2010; Hou et al., 2015; Warr & Yusuf, 2013).
Since such price hikes represent an adverse economic shocks to net-food-buying
households in developing countries,they may resort to credit or their buffer stocks
to smoothing consumption (Sirisankanan, 2015). However, Basu and Tzannatos
(2003) argue that poor households may be constrained in terms of mitigating op-
tions against such shocks. With limited access to credit and lack of buffer stock,
they may, thus, be required to increase their labour supply(Chaudhuri & Raval-
lion, 1997; Morduch, 1995). Even in the absence of explicit shocks, income from
child labour sometimes constitute a significant proportion of the household’s in-
come (Koomson & Asongu, 2016). Cockburn (2002) estates that income from child
labour accounts for about four to eight percent of household income in Ethiopia.
Exploring the effects of wheat prices on child welfare in Pakistan, Hou et
al. (2015) find a negative effect of a price increase on school enrolment.6 Bibi et al.
(2010) suggest that Malian households are more likely to withdraw their children
from school and put them into economic activities as commodity prices increase.
These studies use a single commodity (rice or maize) as a proxy for the price of
the average food basket. However, if household food consumption is made up of
more than one major crop, which is likely to be the case, using the price of a
single staple may not serve as a suitable proxy (Ravallion, 1990). We contribute
to this literature by using a comprehensive measure of food prices captured by
the market price index of the food basket of the average Ugandan household.
Focusing specifically on household welfare in Uganda, Benson, Mugarurab,
and Wandac (2008) suggest a small but a positive impact of higher food prices on
household welfare since the average diet is made up of mostly non-tradable staples.
Bellemare, Fajardo-Gonzalez, and Gitter (2016) also find that an increase in food
6 The effect of the price of wheat on child labour is statistically insignificant in their analysis.
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prices have positive impact on household welfare.7 In contrast, Van Campenhout
et al. (2013) and Simler (2010) argue that the incidence and depth of poverty
increased in Uganda in the short-term due to higher food prices. This study
further contributes to these findings by explicitly focusing on the incidence and
intensity of child labour and distinguishing the use of child labour in landowning
households.
The incentive to use children on farms tends to be greater among landown-
ing households because the marginal productivity of labour increases with land
size (Bhalotra & Heady, 2003). This is particularly re-enforced by the absence of a
well-functioning agricultural labour market (Oryoie, Alwang, & Tideman, 2017),
which causes households to rely on their own members to provide labour. Hence,
an understanding of the role of land in child labour is relevant in different African
countries where post-colonial governments have embarked on land redistribution
programmes. In most cases, the land has been taken from commercial farmers
to the poor and previously landless households whose only sources of labour is
their adult and child members. In Zimbabwe, where one of the largest land redis-
tribution programmes has occurred, Oryoie et al. (2017) show that child labour
tends to increase with land holdings. This result is also in line with the argument
that asset-based poverty reduction strategies could increase the incidence of child
labour (Cockburn & Dostie, 2007).
Moreover, landholding is particularly important in the context of this study
for two other reasons. First, land can be rented out to raise additional income,
hence, the need for an additional income from child labour may be reduced (Kis-
Katos, 2010). Second, households could use their land as collateral for credit
which further reduces the need for child (Bhalotra & Heady, 2003). However,
labour market imperfections, as it is the case in most developing countries, could
7 Studies for the International Food Policy Research Institute (see Ulimwengu & Ramadan,
2012 and Van Campenhout, Pauw, & Minot, 2013) also analyse different associations be-
tween food prices and household welfare in Uganda. Households may be able to increase
output to gain from the higher food prices (as suggested by Ulimwengu & Ramadan, 2012).
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make land ownership to increase child labour during periods of higher food prices
(Basu, Das, & Dutta, 2010; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003). Therefore, it is not clear
how land ownership will affect the relationship between higher food prices and
child labour. The chapter contributes to this open question by investigating the
moderating effect of land ownership on the relationship between food prices and
child labour.
In addition, it is possible to have a non-linear effect of food prices on child
labour over time. Agricultural households may adjust both their food consump-
tion and input decisions to meet the new prices. Farm household may try to find
additional resources to increase their production to gain higher income from the
prices. Therefore, even if higher food prices increase child labour in the initial
period, we may expect the impact to diminish over time as farm households adjust
their production decisions. In a similar manner, the initial impact resulting from
the expenditure effect could also diminish as net-food-buying households also ad-
just their consumption decisions. As an additional contribution of this chapter to
the existing literature, we analyse the short, medium and long-term impacts of
higher food prices on child labour.
2.3. Methodology
2.3.1. Context and Data
Uganda has experienced steady economic growth (UBOS, 2014), and the average
income levels reached approximately $705.3 in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). However,
during the same period about 2.75 million children, aged 5-17 years, were engaged
in economic activities, and 51 percent of them were involved in hazardous activities
(MGLSD, 2012; UBOS, 2010).8 Diverse government reports (see MGLSD, 2012;
USDOL, 2015) indicates that about 31 percent of children in the country are
engaged in child labour. These children work in activities such as stone quarrying,
8 These reports define a child as between 5-17 years
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brick making and laying, clay mining, commercial agriculture and commercial
sexual exploitation are among the the predominant activities of child labourers in
the country.
Guarcello, Furio, Breglia, and Ssennono (2008) suggest that poverty, like
in many African countries, is a leading cause of child labour in Uganda. There
also exist geographical differences in the distribution of child labour in the coun-
try. About 42 percent of rural children are economically active compared to 15
percent of urban children; economically active children are more concentrated in
the Eastern, Central and Western regions. Most of the working children in rural
Uganda are engaged in family work (97 percent), although some of them are also
found in the manufacturing and service sectors. A detailed report on child labour
in Uganda is provided by Guarcello et al. (2008), Macro International Inc (2011)
and Walakira et al. (2016).
Regarding food supply, Uganda is nearly self-sufficient in terms of its major
staples aside from rice and wheat. The country serves as a source of food imports
for its east African neighbours, including Kenya. Nevertheless, Uganda has ex-
perienced a steady increase in food prices, consistent with what is observed on
the international market (Ulimwengu & Ramadan, 2012), and the prices of local
staples (matoke9, cassava, and sorghum) also increased between 2008 and 2010.
Changes in weather patterns, weakening currency and export of Ugandan crops
to neighbouring countries as well as higher fuel prices have been cited as some
of the important causes of the rising food prices (B. M. Dillon & Barrett, 2015;
Ivanic et al., 2012; Mbowa, Mawejje, & Kasirye, 2012), though with producing
clear evidence.
Data for the analysis is drawn from the Ugandan National Panel Survey
(UNPS) which we merge with relevant market level monthly consumer price in-
dexes reported by the UBOS. The UNPS is a nationally representative panel,
which is based on the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Survey. We
9 Matoke is the local name for plantain
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employ the last three waves 2009/2010, 2010/2011 and 2011/2012. The data con-
tains detailed information on all the labour activities of household member (five
years or older at the time of data collection) in the last eight days preceding
the survey. It also contains detailed questions on the economic and demographic
characteristics of the household as well as some community level characteristics.
2.3.2. Measurement of Child Labour and Food Price Vari-
ables
(i) Child labour
Following Bandara et al. (2015), Beegle et al. (2006), Edmonds (2005) and Hou
(2015), we measure child labour with two variables: (1) an indicator variable
which equals one if the child engaged in any economic activity during the reference
period, labelled as ChildWorked in the regression models and (2) the number of
hours the child worked, labeled HoursWorked. Thereby, we aim to measure the
incidence as well as the intensity of child labour. The unit of observation for
our analysis is the child. The measurement of child labour includes paid and
non-paid work as is common in the literature (Beegle et al., 2006; Carpio et al.,
2016; Edmonds, 2005). Indeed, economic shocks may directly affect child labour
when the child is made to work for income because of the economic hardship. At
the same time, a child may have to performs chores that were previously done by
adults in order to release time for adults to earn more income.10 More importantly,
independent of explicit payment or not, the ILO defines child labour to include
activities that are considered physically and mentally dangerous for the child.
The UNPS, however, does not contain information to distinguish which activity
is hazardous or not. In addition, as has been shown by IPEC and Edmonds (2009),
domestic activities do not differ from market activities in terms of their impact
10 Thus, a non-restrictive measure of child labour also includes non-paid work. Indeed, some
of the domestic and farm work are sometimes done under hazardous conditions (Admassie,
2002).
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on school attendance, hence any attempt to focus only on market activities will
provide a partial understanding of the problem.
To achieve consistency with the international definition of child labour,
we study only children between 5 and 14 years old. According to the ILO, the
minimum age for light work is 12 years (IPEC, 2011), hence any work by children
between 5 and 11 years is considered as child labour. We, therefore, perform
a separate analysis for children between 5 and 11 years. Finally, the data is
restricted to the children for whom there is information across the three waves
of the UNPS (2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012). The set of questions used in
constructing the child labour variables are provided in Appendix 2.A3.
(ii) Food price
Regarding food prices, we constructed the cost of food from the monthly Consumer
Price Index (CPI) reported by UBOS. This is computed for seven major markets
in Uganda (Arua, Jinja, Kampala, Masaka, Mbale, Mbarara and, Gulu). This
price index provides a comprehensive measure of the general trend of the average
consumption basket in Uganda. Thus, we are able to evaluate the impact of
overall changes in food prices on child labour. We merged households to these
CPIs based on their physical proximity to a particular market and the month in
which the questionnaire was administered. We merged the data by generating the
distance between a household and all the seven markets using the geo-coordinates
of the household and the market centres. After identifying the nearest market, we
then pair questionnaire month to the respective month in the CPI report. This
procedure provides variation in both space and time even for households within
the same cluster. For instance, households which are in the same community but
were interviewed in different months may have different CPIs.
Summary statistics for all these variables and standard controls with the
corresponding sources are presented in Table 2.A1 in the appendix of the study.
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2.3.3. Empirical Model and Identification
(i) Empirical model
In line with our objective of analysing the influence of food price changes on the
incidence and intensity of child labour, we start with a conventional regression
approach in equations (2.1) and (2.2):
ChildWorkedit =αi + βt + γFoodPriceit + Child′itΦ1 +HH ′itΦ2
+ COMM ′itΦ3 + it (2.1)
and
HoursWorkedit =αi + βt + γFoodPriceit + Child′itΦ1 +HH ′itΦ2
+ COMM ′itΦ3 + it (2.2)
where, FoodPrice is the market-level food price index. Child is a matrix of
the child’s time-variant characteristics which includes, among others, age of the
child and whether she is in school or not. HH and COMM are matrices of
household and community characteristics respectively, including such variables as
(the household’s size, total expenditure, average schooling of household members;
average annual temperature and rainfall).11 ChildWorked is an indicator variable
for child labour and HoursWorked is the number of hours the child worked in
the last 8 days prior to the survey. To control for time invariant unobserved
characteristics of the child, we estimate fixed effect models for equations (2.1) and
(2.2) captured by αi. βt is a time fixed effect.
(ii) Identification
We aim to isolate and identify the causal effect of exogenous food price changes on
the incidence and intensity of child labour. Although it is unlikely that market-
level prices are influenced by individual decisions of households (reverse causal-
11 See Tables 2.A1 and 2.A2 in the Appendix for a complete list of all control variables.
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ity), the coefficient of FoodPrices in equations (2.1) and (2.2) may be driven
by unobserved household characteristics and potential measurement errors, even
though we account for individual fixed-effects. Indeed, the decision to engage in
child labour is usually made by parents (Webbink, Smits, & de Jong, 2012) and
depending on the inter-temporal preference for income of the family head, one
may speculate speculated that the effect of food prices on child labour could vary
both within and across households over time. Thus, our ability to interpret the
observed coefficient as a causal effect hinges on the exogeneity of FoodPrices.
The identification strategy adopted in this study involves the use of instru-
mental variables. We use international food prices as an instrument for domestic
market-level food prices (see T. G. Smith, 2014 for a similar strategy).More pre-
cisely, we used the one-month lag of IMF’s monthly international food price index
as an instrument for the domestic food price index in Uganda. It It is important to
examine the proposed instrument within the context of Uganda to ascertain their
validity.12 Uganda constitutes a negligible proportion of global food trade (see
T. G. Smith, 2014) such that world food prices can be seen as exogenous, partic-
ularly for individual Ugandan farmers. Therefore, domestic events in Uganda will
not affect world food prices. International food prices, however, explain market-
level prices in Uganda because the country is a net food importer. Indeed, while
Uganda seemed unaffected by global food price hikes at the beginning of 2008,
the country started experiencing food prices increases by December 2008, there
have been projections of a further increase due to high demand from neighbour-
ing countries (see Ulimwengu & Ramadan, 2012; IFPRI, 2008 for further details).
This is an indication that it takes time for domestic prices to respond to changes
in international prices, hence our use of the lag of international food prices as
an instrument. Based on the above explanations, we modify Equations (2.1) and
(2.2) as follows:
12 For our instrument to be valid, it must correlate with our variable FoodPrice (relevance
condition) and it must affect child labour only through FoodPrice (exclusion restriction),
or put differently; it must not correlate with the error terms in equations (2.1) and (2.2).
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Childworked =αi + βt + γ ̂FoodPriceiy + Child′itφ1 +HH ′itφ2
+ COMM ′itφ3 + it (2.3)
and
HoursWorked =αi + βt + γ ̂FoodPriceiy + Child′itφ1 +HH ′itφ2
+ COMM ′itφ3 + it (2.4)
̂FoodPrice is the prediction of food prices from the first stage regression of domes-
tic food prices (variable to be instrumented) on international food prices (main
instrumental variable) and the other controls.
A relevant and statistically significant effect of FoodPrice alludes itself to
either an intensive or extensive marginal effect. The intensive margin represents
the effect of economic shocks on the number of work hours of children who were
already working before the shock (it refers to a change in working time). The
extensive margin represents the effect on the incidence of child labour (the effect
of economic shocks on children previously not working). In Table 2.6, we refine
equations (2.1) and (2.2) to explore these interpretation issues by estimating the
intensive and extensive margin effect of FoodPrice based on whether the child
worked or not in the first panel. We then run equations (2.1) on (2.2) conditional
on the child working or not in 2009/2010. We distinguish these for scientific
interest and policy relevance: if food prices changes affect child labour mainly
through the intensive margin, then children from poor households are most likely
more affected than richer households.
In addition, we also analyse the interaction effects of land ownership and
the household’s net-market status with food prices. This is done to examine how
the effect of changes in food prices differ across households with different land
endowments and food self-sustenance. Thereby we can explore how such factors
moderate the relationship between food prices and child labour.
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2.3.4. Summary Description of the Main Variables
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of child labour between farm work and off-farm
activities as yearly averages for the three periods. The average food prices for the
respective are also presented in the table. The proportion of children who worked
on family farms during the study periods is between 29 and 35 percent, making
family farms the predominant work for children in Uganda. Including all forms
of work, more than a quarter of children in Uganda reported to have worked in
2009/2010 while about a third of them worked in 2011/2012. We also note that
food prices have increased for the same time period from an average index value
of 168 to 249.
Table 2.1.: Labour participation rates of children according to type of work, hours
of work and food prices in Uganda


















2009/2010 0.26 0.04 0.29 2.66 9.76 168.15
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.38) (0.17)
2010/2011 0.33 0.02 0.35 3.12 9.68 226.04
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.31) (0.52)
2011/2012 0.34 0.02 0.35 3.04 9.12 249.43
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) (0.31) (0.38)
All years 0.31 0.03 0.31 2.94 9.50 214.54
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.19) (0.44)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Proportion for rows do not sum up to 1 because
the groups are not mutually exclusive and the calculation is done over the entire
sample for a particular year. Child labour statistics are based on the labour activities
of children in the last eight days preceding the survey.
Figure 2.1 provides an illustration and the motivation for our research
question. Figure 1a shows a steep upward trend of market-level food prices.13 We
13 This upward trend, though less pronounced, is also consistent with movement of interna-
tional food prices.
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plot the overall consumer price index for comparison; this has also been increasing
but food prices rose more sharply. Figure 1b plots the percentage of child labour
and the change of food prices during the same period in our sample, this show that
child labour follows a similar trend as food prices. Since this is just a descriptive
graph, the relationship observed is susceptible to biases arising from different
things such as general economics growth and openness to trade. To rule out
the possibility that correlates at the individual, household or neighbourhood and
other forms of endogeneity bias explain the observed association between food
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Panel (b): Child Labor and Food Price Index
Figure 2.1.: Trend of Child Labour and Food Prices in Uganda (2008-2012)
Table 2.2 presents the prevalence of child labour across a selection of child
and household characteristics. As expected, older children (between 10-14 years)
have a higher tendency to work than younger children (between 5-9 years), so do
male children as compared to their female counterparts. The table indicates that
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the proportion of working children in female-headed households is slightly higher
than in male-headed households.On the relationship between land ownership and
child labour, we observe that child labour is positively associated with landown-
ership. This relationship shows an apparent paradox of wealth, which may be
due to labour or credit market imperfections (Basu, 2006; Bhalotra & Heady,
2003; Dumas, 2007).14 At the same time it has to be noted that land-owning
households are usually situated in rural areas where the incidence of child labour
is higher. The table reveals that the incidence of child labour tend to be lower
in net-food-buying household compared to those who depend on the market for a
significant proportion of the their food.
Table 2.2.: Labour participation rate of children in Uganda by age, gender and
household land ownership status
Characteristics 2009/2010 2010/2011 2011/2012
Proportion(SE) Proportion(SE) Proportion(SE)
Age of child (years)
5-11 0.24 (0.01) 0.26 (0.01) 0.23 (0.01)
12-14 0.46 (0.03) 0.54 (0.02) 0.50 (0.02)
Difference -0.21 (0.03) -0.28 (0.02) -0.26 (0.02)
Gender of child
Female 0.25 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01) 0.31 (0.01)
Male 0.29 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01) 0.35 (0.01)
Difference -0.04 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02)
Gender of Household head
Female 0.30 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02)
Male 0.28 (0.01) 0.33 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01)
Difference 0.02 (0.02) 0.05 ( 0.02) 0.04 (0.02)
Land owning household?
No 0.15 (0.02) 0.28 (0.02) 0.26 (0.02)
Yes 0.30 (0.01) 0.33 ( 0.01) 0.34 (0.01)
Difference -0.14 (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) -0.08 (0.03)
Net-food buying household?
No 0.33 (0.01) 0.38 (0.01) 0.39 (0.01)
Yes 0.20 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01)
Difference 0.13 (0.02) 0.11 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02)
Note: SE=Standard error
14 The empirical literature has not produced a conclusive finding on the effect of land owner-




Table 2.3 reports the findings of the effect of food prices changes on the incidence
(columns 1, 3, and 5) and the intensity (columns 2, 4 and 6) of child labour. In all
specifications, we control for time-varying individual, household and community
characteristics as well as for the season and year fixed effects. Moreover, we always
account for either regional or individual fixed effects effects.15
Consistent with the pattern illustrated in Figure 2.1, specification 1 and 2
of Table 2.3 show a positive effect of food prices on the incidence and the intensity
of child labour even when we control for individual characteristics (age, gender,
and schooling status of the child). The coefficient for FoodPrice is statistically
significant at the one percent level in the case of specification 1. Specifications
3 and 4 also present a random effect estimates and in specifications 5 and 6
we account for individual fixed effects. In columns 3 to 6 we take account of
other costs of living by adding additional price information (prices of clothing,
education, transportation, rent and fuel, and health). This is to insure that the
results are not driven by the general price increase but by food price increases.
The effect of our main variable of interest remains statistically significant in these
models. Regarding the economic relevance of the effects, the point estimates of
the most stringent fixed-effects model show that an increase in food prices by 10
percent of it initial value will be associated with approximately 12 percent higher
probability of a child being engaged in child labour. Similarly, a 10 percent
increase in food prices is associated with approximately .20 hours (12 minutes) 16.
Thus, in Uganda where between 2008 to 2011 food prices increased by 58 percent
percent, the estimated effects translate into a rise in the intensity of child labour
15 When accounting for region and individual fixed effects at the same time, our results remain
qualitatively and quantitatively the same but we note that the variation then only comes
from a comparatively small number of households that changed region.
16 Barrera-Gomez and Basagana (2015) provides the basis for this interpretation.
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by .63 hours (38 minutes) which is higher than the observed difference of .46 hours
(28 minutes) of child labour.
Table 2.3.: Effect of food prices on child labour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Random Effect Fixed Effect
(Logit-OR) (Linear) (Logit-OR) (Linear) (Logit-OR) (Linear)
Worked Hours Worked Hours Worked Hours
Log of food price 3.24∗∗∗ 1.32 4.25∗∗∗ 2.80∗∗∗ 3.12∗∗ 2.12∗
(1.21) (0.94) (1.75) (1.03) (1.75) (1.26)
Other price controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286
R2 0.09 0.10 0.19
Note: (#) Standard error; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. Coefficients in columns
1,3 and 5 are the odd ratios (OR) of engaging in child labour. Other price controls
(prices of clothing, education, health, rent and fuel, and transportation); child time
variant characteristics (age and the square term, gender, whether the child is in school
or not, whether the child leaves with parents); Household characteristics (average
schooling years of household members, number of children, number of members with
paid employees, number of sick adult members, age and gender of the household head,
adult equivalence, net market status, log expenditure, ownership of land and asset
in index, urban residence). When Child fixed effects are included, only time variant
household characteristics are introduced in the setting. Time fixed effects are the
season and year of the survey. The complete version of this table is presented in
Appendix 2.A2.
These results are consistent with the view that food inflation presents a
major shock to expenditure, as a high proportion of household expenditure in
Uganda, 30 to 56 percent, goes into food purchases (UBOS, 2013). Thus, the
findings support the idea that households may resort to child labour as a survival
mechanism when hit by external adverse shocks (de Hoop & Rosati, 2014). Short
term survival may be the driving motivation for the household to increase child
labour during a period of food inflation. In Uganda, this may be re-enforced by
the fact that higher food prices may increase the opportunity cost of a child’s
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leisure time. Thus, parents may prefer current income from the child’s labour to
her future income.17
Regarding the control variables (the full results are presented in Table
2.A2 in the appendix), we find negative effects of the average years of schooling,
number of adult household members, and asset ownership on child labour18. In
addition, male children and older children are more likely to engage in child labour
in Uganda. On the effect on household net market status, we find that child labour
increases with higher market dependence.
2.4.2. Double-Hurdle, Instrumental Variables (IV), and To-
bit Estimates
In Table 2.4, we first present the result of instrumental variable estimations using
international food prices as instrument for market-level prices in Uganda. An as-
sessment of the first stage results shows that the instrument correlates highly with
domestic food prices. Indeed, the diagnostic tests show that the instrument per-
forms favourably in the traditional test of weak identification (high F-statistic) and
the LM statistic of underidentification and its p-value show that the instrument
is relevant.19 In all specifications, we estimate a positive impact of an increase
in food price on child labour. In columns 3 and 4, the estimates translate a 10
percent increase in food price to about 8 percent higher chance of a child working
and 1.6 more hours of work.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.4, we explore the truncated nature of child
labour hours using the Tobit estimator and the double-hurdle estimator (Cragg,
17 Given a recent empirical finding by Kavuma, Morrissey, and Upward (2015) that private re-
turns to education have been decreasing in Uganda, parents may find it rational to increase
child labour to maximize household income during periods of food price rise.
18 These results are consistent with the view that households with educated adults are more
aware of the negative effects of child labour and the argument that child labour becomes the
last resort in the absence of asset and any form of collateral security (Basu & Tzannatos,
2003)
19 We note, however, that the instruments are constrained in terms of it ability to capture
within market variation in food prices because the capture monthly variation across all
markets.
33
Chapter 2. The Effect of Food Price Changes on Child Labour
1971; D. Dong & Kaiser, 2008; Engel & Moffatt, 2014) for the number of hours
worked. The Tobit estimator confirms our earlier findings in terms of statistical
significance and effect magnitude. The estimated coefficient indicates that a 10
percent increase in food prices leads to about one hour of extra work. The panel-
hurdle estimator employed in column 6 has the advantage that individuals who
reported zero hours of child labour can be categorized into two types: those who
will never participate in child labour irrespective of the economic circumstances
(the so called certain zeros); and those who report zero because of their current
circumstances.20 We apply the bootstrap version of the estimators to establish the
standard errors. Following Engel and Moffatt (2014), we match the panel struc-
ture of the data by clustering around individual children and drawing successive
sample from these clusters. The panel-hurdle estimator also yields a positive and
statistically significant effect of food prices on the intensity of child labour. In
terms of magnitude the result corresponds to about one extra hour of child worked
for a 10 percent increase in food price.
As a further robustness test, we estimate separate individual fixed effect
models for the different gender and age groups in Table 2.5. The age categories in
Table 2.5 are defined to correspond with the ILO’s categorization, where children
between 5 and 11 years are not supposed to engage in any form of work. We find
that child labour among this age group as well as those between 12 and 14 years
tend to increase with an increase in food prices. As expected, columns 1 to 4 show
that child labour appears to be higher among the 12 to 14 year group. Table 2.5
also shows that both girls and boys are affected by higher food prices. We find
that the incidence and intensity of child labour among boys appears to be higher
than girls in Uganda, but the effect on participation rate is similar. This differing
impact for boys and girls is a reflection of the fact that child labour in Uganda is
20 The double-hurdle estimator takes account of the fact that the participation decision in
child labour may be determined by two processes, i.e. hurdles: Whether the individual is
a zero type, i.e. never engaging in child labour, or not is determined by the first hurdle.
Then the second hurdle determines the extent of participation contingent on the individual
not being a zero type (Engel & Moffatt, 2014).
34
predominantly an agriculture phenomenon, where the marginal product of boys
tend to be higher than girls. Hence, there is a greater motivation for households
to employ more boys than girls.
Table 2.4.: Double-hurdle, IV, and Tobit, estimates of the effect of food prices on
child labour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Random Effect Fixed Effect
LPM Linear LPM Linear Tobit DH
Worked Hours Worked Hours Hours Hours
Log of food price 0.66∗∗∗ 10.66∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 17.06∗∗∗ 10.55∗∗∗ 10.6∗∗∗
(0.16) (2.66) (0.18) (3.09) (3.62) (3.0)
Other price controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286
Under ID LM statistic 1019.01 1002.23 752.16 752.16
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Weak ID Wald F statistic 1157.97 1136.28 1317.80 1317.80
Inverse Mills ratio 18.3
[0.052]
Note: (#) Standard error; [#] p-value of test statistic; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
. LPM in columns 1 and 3 denotes a linear probability model. First lag of the IMF’s
monthly international food price index is used as the instrument for domestic prices
in columns 1-4. The same controls in Table 3 are used. Tobit estimates of column 5
is the marginal effect of predicting positive hours of work. DH= Double hurdle(with
Bootstrap results from 1000 repetitions).
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Table 2.5 – continued from previous page
Table 2.5.: Instrumental variable estimates of the effect of food prices on child
labour-Fixed effects estimates (Sub-samples based on age and gender
of the child)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5-11 years 12-14 years Girls Boys
Worked Hours Worked Hours Worked Hours Worked Hours
Log of food price 0.76∗∗∗ 12.02∗∗∗ 0.81∗ 25.21∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 19.87∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 14.48∗∗∗
(0.20) (3.00) (0.46) (8.46) (0.25) (4.27) (0.26) (4.49)
Other price controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5969 5969 1647 1647 4052 4052 4232 4232
Under ID LM statistic 724.40 724.40 194.92 139.72 377.04 377.04 379.31 379.31
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Weak ID Wald F statistic 886.19 886.19 235.22 240.49 667.91 667.91 656.34 656.34
Note: (#) Standard error; [#] p-value of test statistic; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗
p < .01. . LPM denotes a linear probability model. First lag of the IMF’s monthly
international food price index is used as the instrument for domestic prices in columns
1-8. The same controls in Table 3 are used.
All the previous results have been shown to be robust to the inclusion of
the prices of other components of the consumption basket, individual and child
characteristics, child fixed effects and region fixed effects, as well as potential
endogeneity concerns. An increase in food prices can, therefore, be regarded as
an adverse economic shock leading to a higher incidence and intensity of child
labour.
2.4.3. Refinements and Additional Results
(i) Extensive and intensive margins
A rise in food price can increase child labour by either causing previously non-
working children to work (extensive margin effect) or causing previously working
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children to work for more hours (intensive margin effect). Each of these paths tells
us more about which households, regarding poverty status, suffer most from the
increase in food prices. If the effect only works through the intensive margin, then
poorer households disproportionately suffer from price since these children can be
assumed to come from already poor household before the price shock. However,
if the relationship works through the extensive margin, such that children who
previously did not work are made to work now, then a rise in food prices may
have widened poverty.
We carry out the analysis by partitioning the data set into two sub-samples;
children who worked in 2009/2010 and those who did not. Using the same set
of control variables in Table 2.3 we estimate the extensive margins effect with
the probability that a child who did not work in 2009/2010 would work in the
subsequent years because of increase in food price. Column 2 of Table 2.6 shows
a positive and significant effect of food prices changes on the probability that a
child will work for the first time after 2009/2010. The effect size shows that the
probability that children who were not previously working will work at least once
in the subsequent period increases by about 3 percent for a 10 percent increase in
food prices in Uganda.
(ii) Lags of food prices
So far, our results implicitly assume that the household responds to changes in
food prices instantaneously. However, we may expect that there are time lags
before households re-adjust their labour allocations in response to food price hikes.
Thus, we examine this issue in Table 2.7 to get a better grasp of the adjustment
process. We take account of the time horizon by including lags over the farming
season.21 The immediate impact is approximated by the current price and, we
then capture the medium to long-term effects with the average of the first three
21 A typical farming season in Uganda lasts 3 to 4 months, hence the lags we choose are
enough for the household to re-adjust expenditure and labour decisions such that the effect
on child labour is observed when the household has fully adjusted to the initial shock.
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and first six months lags successively.
Table 2.6.: Instrumental variable estimation of the extensive and intensive
marginal effects of food prices on child labour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extensive margins Intensive margin
Worked Worked Hours Hours
Log of food price 0.11 0.28∗∗ -1.79 -0.14
(0.09) (0.13) (3.53) (5.11)
Other price controls No Yes No Yes
Other price controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4017 4017 1503 1503
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.25
Note: (#) Standard errors; [#] p-values. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. The same
controls in Table 2.3 are used
The inclusion of the lagged terms increases the point estimate of the level
of food price observed in Table 2.3. However, the effect tends to be negative
after the initial increases as shown by the negative coefficient of the average of the
lagged food price. This is an indication that households may gain from higher food
prices, but this gain could only be realized with some time lag. This gain could
come from higher incomes as households readjust their production and labour
decisions to take advantage of the higher prices. For agricultural households, this
entails increasing production to increase sales. For non-agriculture, but labour-
supplying households, higher food prices may induce higher wages (Mghenyi, 2009;
Ravallion, 1990) in the long run to mitigate the higher food prices. Thus, the long-
run effect of the initial food price changes could be positive neutral or negative
depending on the magnitudes of the expenditure and income effects. In Table 2.7,
we observe that the combined effect of the level of food price and the lag term is
positive but a formal test shows that the difference in this case is not statistically
significant.
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Table 2.7.: Effect of food price on child labour with the lags of food price - Fixed
effects estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LPM Linear LPM Linear LPM Linear
Worked Hours Worked Hours Worked Hours
Log of food price 0.14∗ 2.12∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 5.96∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 4.19∗∗
(0.08) (1.24) (0.11) (1.81) (0.10) (1.68)
Avg. of lags 1-3 -0.21∗ -5.18∗∗∗
(0.11) (1.77)
Avg. of lags 1-6 -0.13 -3.45∗
(0.12) (1.88)
Other price controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286 8286
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.19 0.30 0.19 0.30 0.19
Note: (#) Standard error; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. LPM denotes a linear
probability model. The same controls in Table 3 are used.
(iii) Interaction effects of household land ownership and net market status
Following the literature on household asset ownership and child labour (Hou et
al., 2015; Basu, 2006; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; Basu & Van, 1998), we examine
how landownership moderates the effect of food price on child labour. In Table
2.8 we interact landownership with food prices. The effect of a change in food
price on the incidence of child labour is lower for landowning households than
non-landowning households as evidenced by the negative interaction effect in col-
umn 1. In effect, we estimate that for a 10 percent increase in food prices, the
probability of participating in child labour is about .02 percent lower for children
in landowning households. Thus, we estimate a moderating effect of landowner-
ship on child labour participation. This finding supports the poverty hypothesis
of Basu (2006). We attribute the moderating effect of land to two reasons. First,
landowning households can quickly expand output to take advantage of higher
prices to increase income. Second, landownership affords households the oppor-
tunity to obtain credit at lower interest rates. This credit can then be used to
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buy inputs to increase output or to finance household expenditure. Thus, these
households may not have to fall on child labour as a source of extra income.
We assume that net food buyers may be more affected by higher food
price than net producers. In columns 3 and 4, we investigate this assertion by
interacting food prices with the market status of the households. The results
show that the net market position of the household does not have any significant
moderation effect on the effect of food prices on child labour in Uganda.
Table 2.8.: Effect of food prices on child labour
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM Linear LPM Linear
Worked Hours Worked Hours
Log of food price 0.35∗∗∗ 1.50 0.14∗ 2.45∗
(0.11) (1.64) (0.08) (1.36)
Log food price*HH land ownership -0.22∗∗∗ 0.65
(0.07) (1.23)
Log food price*HH net market status -0.00 1.02
(0.08) (1.50)
HH net market status 0.05∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 0.07 -4.34
(0.03) (0.42) (0.44) (8.04)
HH land ownership 1.18∗∗∗ -3.24 0.03 0.21
(0.39) (6.59) (0.02) (0.33)
Other price controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8286 8286 8286 8286
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.19 0.30 0.19
Note: (#) Standard errors; [#] p-values; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01. LPM
denotes a linear probability model. The same controls in Table 3 are used.
2.5. Conclusion
We analysed the impact of food price changes on child labour. We carried out the
analysis using data sets from Uganda, one of the countries with a high incidence
of child labour in Sub-Saharan Africa. We account for endogeneity by employing
international food prices as an instrument for domestic market-level food prices.
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Empirical results indicate that a rise in food price leads to a higher incidence
and intensity of child labour. The quantitative results for a rise in food prices
are sizeable: 10 percent increase in food prices leads to about 8 percent increase
in the participation rate and about 1.6 increase in the number of hours worked.
Thus, global food price hikes between 2008 and 2010 may have contributed to a
significant increase in child labour. The results are consistent with similar studies
that have highlighted adverse effects of food price hikes on farm households in
developing countries. Adverse economic shocks can force households to adopt
measures to increase its income; these measures may include child labour.
Moreover, our results show that the effects are stronger for boys than
for girls. We also show that higher food prices affect child labour on both the
extensive and intensive margins. Importantly, the analysis also indicates that the
influence of food price shocks is smaller for children in landowning households.
Thus, landownership serves as a critical buffer to mitigate the effect of rising food
prices.
A policy implication of the findings is that food price hikes may impact
child labour. Child labour is known to have potential long-lasting effect on hu-
man capital and, thus, food price hikes may reduce the effectiveness of poverty
reduction programs. Hence, programs that aim at alleviating the impact of food
prices should be comprehensive enough to deal with its effects on child labour.
In doing so, such programs should consider the socio-economic circumstances of
households to better address their specific needs. Our results show that provid-
ing the same assistance to both landowning and non-landowning households will
be more beneficial to children in landowning households than those in landless
households for whom the negative impact of a change in food price is higher.
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Appendix
2.A. Summary Description of the Main Variables
Table 2.A1.: Descriptive statistics of independent variables
Variable N Mean SD
Whether child worked or not 8286 0.31 0.46
Number of hours the child worked 8286 2.94 6.93
Food Consumption Price Index 8286 214.54 39.70
Price index of beverages 8286 158.91 25.90
Price index of clothing 8286 154.90 25.72
Price index of rent and utilities 8286 189.14 31.39
Price index of household personal goods 8286 184.95 30.01
Price index of transportation 8286 127.28 16.52
Price index of eduction 8286 159.94 20.27
Price index of health 8286 161.40 26.23
Age of child 8286 9.46 2.47
Sex of child 8286 0.51 0.50
Child attends school 8286 0.87 0.34
Child’s father is in HH 8286 0.67 0.47
Child’s mother is in HH 8286 0.77 0.42
Number of employees in HH 8286 0.99 1.00
Average years of schooling of HH adults 8286 1.73 1.24
Age of household head 8286 45.51 12.26
Sex of HH head 8286 0.74 0.44
HH adult equivalence 8286 5.33 1.95
HH market status 8286 0.46 0.31
Log HH expenditure 8286 10.54 0.73
HH asset index 8286 0.12 0.09
Number of adult ill in HH 8286 0.92 0.96
HH owns land 8286 0.85 0.36
Season of interview 8286 0.51 0.50
Residence 8286 0.17 0.37
Region of residence 8286 2.45 1.07
Year of interview 8286 2.00 0.82
Average monthly temperature 8286 -0.00 11.52
Average monthly rainfall 8286 1.14 166.40
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2.B. Full Results of Table 2.3 with Control Variables
Table 2.A2.: Effect of food prices on child labour – Full results with control vari-
ables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RE FE
(Logit-OR) (Logit-OR) (Linear) (Logit-OR) (Linear)
Worked Worked Hours Worked Hours
Log of food price 3.25∗∗∗ 4.30∗∗∗ 2.80∗∗∗ 3.15∗∗ 2.18∗
(1.22) (1.76) (1.03) (1.64) (1.26)
Age of child 2.99∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.62∗∗ 0.01
(0.36) (0.37) (0.25) (0.31) (0.35)
Sqr. of age 0.97∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ -0.01 0.98∗∗ 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Sex of child 1.28∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.15)
Child is in school 2.14∗∗∗ 2.15∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗ 1.57∗∗ -0.44
(0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33)
Age of HH head 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.02 -0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Sex of HH head 0.91 0.91 -0.36
(0.09) (0.09) (0.23)
Child’s father is in HH (dummy) 1.07 1.07 0.12 1.17 -0.22
(0.12) (0.11) (0.25) (0.31) (0.55)
Child’s mother in HH (dummy) 0.87 0.88 0.05 1.06 0.06
(0.08) (0.08) (0.22) (0.21) (0.44)
HH mem. ave. years of schooling 0.96 0.97 0.01 0.89∗ 0.11
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12)
Number of employees in HH 0.94∗ 0.93∗∗ -0.02 1.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.13)
Number of children in HH 1.04∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.04 1.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (.)
HH adult equivalent 0.99 0.99 0.05 1.10∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
Net market status (food) 2.52∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.22) (0.42)
Log household exp. 0.92 0.93 0.05 1.14 0.17
(0.05) (0.06) (0.13) (0.10) (0.19)
HH Asset index 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ -3.10∗∗∗ 0.40 -2.84
(0.05) (0.05) (1.00) (0.33) (1.81)
Number of mem. ill 1.16∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 1.17∗∗∗ 0.13
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.10)
HH own land (dummy) 1.52∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 0.26 1.19 0.21
(0.15) (0.15) (0.25) (0.16) (0.34)
Second cropping season (dummy) 1.14∗∗ 1.12 0.31∗ 1.06 0.43∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.17) (0.12) (0.24)
Urban residence (dummy) 0.32∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ -1.31∗∗∗ 2.56 0.85
(0.04) (0.04) (0.22) (1.71) (0.86)
Ave. monthly temperature 0.99∗∗ 0.99∗∗ 0.01 1.08∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
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Table 2.A2 – continued from previous page
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04)
Ave. monthly rainfall 1.00 1.00 0.00∗∗∗ 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log of education price index 3.76∗∗ -0.54 1.40 -3.56
(2.49) (1.64) (1.80) (3.04)
Log of transportation price index 0.59 -0.96 0.57 1.33
(0.22) (0.89) (0.30) (1.37)
Log of clothing price index 0.73 -3.16∗∗∗ 1.00 -1.66
(0.26) (0.82) (0.60) (1.16)
Log of fuel price index 0.42 -2.79∗∗ 0.33 -5.00∗∗∗
(0.23) (1.36) (0.25) (1.58)
Log of health price index 2.03 4.07∗∗∗ 3.07 4.50∗∗
(1.00) (1.46) (2.27) (1.87)
Region of residence(Ref. = Central)
Eastern 0.61∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ -1.06∗∗∗ 1.00 1.75
(0.06) (0.06) (0.28) (0.00) (1.38)
Northern 0.60∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ -0.21 1.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.09) (0.41) (0.00) (.)
Western 0.34∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ 1.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.28) (0.00) (.)
Year of survey(Ref. = 2009/2010)
2010/2011 0.68∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ -0.49 0.92 0.52
(0.09) (0.09) (0.35) (0.17) (0.49)
2011/2012 0.41∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ -1.11∗ 0.83 0.85
(0.07) (0.08) (0.59) (0.30) (0.95)
Constant 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ -2.97 17.40




N 8286 8286 8286 3786 8286
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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2.C. Questions Used to Construct the Child Labour Indicator
Table 2.A3.: Questions used to construct the child labour indicator and number of hours worked
Question Response
In the last week did [NAME] work for a wage, salary, commission or any payment in kind,
from work in agriculture or non-agriculture, and including doing paid domestic work, even
if it was for only one hour?
1 = Yes 2 = No
In the last week, did [NAME] run a business of any size, for themselves or another house-
hold member, even if it was for only one hour?
1 = Yes 2 = No
In the last week, did [NAME] help without being paid in any kind of business run by this
house-hold, even if it was only for one hour?
1 = Yes 2 = No
In the last week, was [NAME] an apprentice? Include apprenticeships that are paid cash,
paid in kind, unpaid, or for which the apprentice pays to participate
1 = Yes 2 = No
In the last week, did [NAME] work on this house-hold’s farm? Example: tending crops,
feeding animals, etc.
1 = Yes 2 = No
During the last 7 days, how many hours did [NAME] work on each day? Actual number
of hours of hours worked starting from the previous day on may job.(From Sunday to
Saturday)
Hours
In the last 7 days, how much time in hours did [NAME] spend collecting firewood for the
household, including travel time?
Hours
In the last 7 days, how much time in hours did [NAME] spend fetching water for the
household, including travel time?
Hours
In the last 7 days, how much time in hours did [NAME] spend constructing your dwelling,
farm buildings, private roads, or wells?
Hours
In the last 7 days, how much time in hours did [NAME] spend making major repairs to
their dwelling, farm buildings, private roads, or wells?
Hours
In the last 7 days, how much time in hours did [NAME] spend on milling and other food
processing for the household?
Hours
In the last 7 days, how much time in hours did [NAME] spend making handicrafts for
household use?
Hours
In the last 7 days, how much time in hours did [NAME] spend on agriculture? Hours
In the last 7 days, how much time in hours did [NAME] spend on hunting and fishing? Hours
Source: UBOS, 2011/12 .
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Africa.
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Abstract
As a response to the perennial low harvest and high food prices, several Sub-
Saharan African countries have instituted agricultural input subsidy programmes
to increase food production and reduce poverty among small scale farmers. Given
that agriculture employs a large portion of working children on the continent,
this chapter studies the effect of these subsidy programmes on child labour. The
chapter analyses three rounds of the Malawi Integrated Household Panel Survey
to answer the research question. The econometric results show that the farm input
subsidy program in Malawi has a significant and positive impact on child labour
in the country. The results suggest that despite the success of the programme
in achieving its core aims, there are unintended negative consequences that could
negatively affect human capital development. This could in turn adversely affect
the ultimate poverty eradication efforts in the country and in the sub-region. To
mitigate this problem, governments and implementing agencies should consider
conditioning the distribution of the inputs on the positive outcome like the school
performance of the wards of beneficiaries.
Keywords: Agricultural input subsidy; Child labour; Farm Input Subsidy Pro-
gramme; Malawi.
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3.1. Introduction
Following the success of Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP), sev-
eral African countries have adopted various forms of agriculture subsidy in what
some researchers have described as the African green revolution (Denning et al.,
2009; Javdani, 2012). To increase food production and reduce poverty, Govern-
ments spend significant proportions of national budgets2 on these programmes to
provide fertilizers and improved crop varieties to small-scale farmers. Agriculture
employs the highest percentage of the world’s working children (Zdunnek et al.,
2008), about 70 percent according to ILO (2017b). It is, therefore, natural to
expect that an intervention that targets the agricultural sector could impact on
child labour. Higher income, food security, improved nutrition and job creation
are often the immediate and direct aims of most agricultural interventions in de-
veloping countries. However, these programmes could have unintended impact on
the household’s decisions concerning child labour.
On the one hand, a successful agricultural intervention could increase in-
come which will allow households to free children from work and ensure that they
enjoy quality education and leisure. But some of these interventions may lead
to more child labour by increasing the productivity of the child on the farm, and
hence the opportunity cost of the child’s time outside the household’s farm. There
is, therefore, the need to study the potential impact of these programmes on child
labour. A clear understanding of how agricultural interventions affect child labour
will improve the design, targeting and implementation of these programmes to en-
sure that, not only is the current welfare of the household enhanced, but its future
is not affected through the potential unintended negative impact on the child’s
human capital development. This will maximize the potential gains from these
policies.
2 Jayne and Rashid (2013) reports that 10 African countries spent US$1.05 billion (28.6% of
public expenditure) on input subsidies in 2011.
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This study evaluates the impact of one of Africa’s successful agricultural
subsidy programmes, the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP), on
child labour. The study applies different econometrics techniques (fixed effects
and instrumental variable models, and propensity score matching) to a micro
panel data from Malawi to show that FISP may have worsened the child labour
situation in the country.
Child labour is primarily considered a poverty phenomenon (Basu & Tzan-
natos, 2003; Dwibedi & Chaudhuri, 2014; Ersado, 2005), so that according to the
luxury axiom (Basu & Van, 1998), an increase in agricultural income may decrease
its incidence among farm households. The fact that good agricultural practices
could lead to the elimination of child labour is well documented in the literature
(Levy, 1985; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1982; Zdunnek et al., 2008). For example,
the mechanisation of agriculture leads to a shift in labour demand from unskilled
manpower to skilled labour which reduces the need for child labour. In addition,
as productivity and income increase, the household can afford better education
and more leisure for their children. Therefore, agricultural interventions may re-
duce the incentive to engage in child labour from both the demand and supply
side. However, these present an ideal, but a rather simplistic view of the complex
relationship between agricultural interventions and child labour.
The nature of agriculture and agricultural interventions in Sub-Sahara
Africa (SSA) could induce child labour. For instance, children may have to take
on tasks which adults had to perform because their parents must attend train-
ing programmes or farmer-field schools. Also, labour-augmenting3 interventions
which increase the productivity of labour may increase the demand for child labour
when the there is an imperfect agricultural market to supply the needed additional
labour.
3 A significant proportion of the agricultural sector in Sub-Saharan Africa can is backward in
terms of technology adoption. Therefore, major agricultural interventions that have target
smallholder households are labour-augmenting, which increase the productivity and the
opportunity of labour.
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Aside from the success and the magnitude of FISP, this study focuses on
Malawi because it is one of the poorest countries in the world with a high inci-
dence of child labour. The 2015 Malawi National Child Labour Survey estimates
that about 48 percent of children in the country were economically active, whilst
30 percent of them worked under hazardous conditions. According to the United
States Department of Labor (USDOL), about 20 percent of children in Malawi
are engaged in worse forms of child labour (USDOL, 2016). The report cites
working on tobacco plantations, fishing, and sexual exploitation as some predom-
inant works for child labourers. These activities expose the children to several
risks including nicotine absorption and sexually transmitted diseases. Orphaned
and children living with parents suffering from chronic diseases like HIV/AIDS
are vulnerable since they sometimes assume the role of household heads at a
rather tender age (USDOL, 2016). Child labour in Malawi is, therefore, driven
by poverty and the lack of access to viable credit (Hazarika & Sarangi, 2008).
In Malawi, there is little agriculture mechanization (Sheahan & Barrett,
2017), therefore, there is a heavy reliance on basic implements like cutlasses, hoes
and manual labour. Therefore, agricultural labour demand is high, and household
members supply much of the needed labour on family farms (Fisher & Kandiwa,
2014). The authors further note that the cultivation of modern maize varieties,
which requires the application of fertilizers, increases the demand for labour during
the peak of the farming season. It is, therefore, intuitive to expect FISP, which
provides fertilizer and improved maize variety, to increases labour demand.
The study contributes to the theoretical and empirical studies on how ac-
cess to productive assets by poor households in developing countries affect the
incidence of child labour. In this literature, there are two strands of arguments.
The first line of thought argues that limited access to assets is the main deter-
minant of poverty and hence child labour. Hence, providing assets to households
present a sustainable strategy for poverty reduction. It also ensures that children
are children are sent to school instead of work (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 1995).
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However, this argument relies on the assumption that education is a normal good
so that an increase in the household’s income increases its consumption. But, as
explained Rogers and Swinnerton (2004), after a certain level of parental income
rises to a certain level, they begin to suspect that children, when adults, will be
less willing to remitte to them in recognition of the expenditure they spent on
their education. The second strand of the argument maintains that access to pro-
ductive assets could raise returns to child labour, and increase child labour among
poor households (Cockburn & Dostie, 2007). There, is empirical support for this
line of thought in Bangladesh, where children from households that own substan-
tive productive asset have a higher likelihood to work (Cain, 1977; Covarrubias,
Davis, & Winters, 2012).
In a review of studies on how public policy affects child labour in develop-
ing countries, Dammert, de Hoop, Mvukiyehe, and Rosati (2018) draw different
conclusions depending on the design and nature of the programme. They con-
clude, among others, that public work programmes that affect the demand side of
labour may have a positive impact on the incidence of child labour in developing
countries. The authors further find that labour-supply side interventions aimed
at providing skill training or capital to individuals have limited effect on child
labour, but there is a significant effect on the child’s time allocation to education.
Despite the extensive nature of this literature, empirical evidence on the direct
impact of an input subsidy programme, like what SSA countries are implementing,
on child labour is missing. This study, therefore, contributes to this literature by
providing empirical evidence of the effect of farm input subsidies on child labour.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows, Section 3.2 presents a
review of the programme and the empirical literature on the impact of the pro-
gramme in Malawi. Section 3.3 presents the data, methods, definition of vari-
ables, and the identification strategies. The empirical results and discussion are
presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 draws conclusions and policy implication
from the study.
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3.2. The Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme
The foremost aims of FISP in Malawi are to increase the production and income
of smallholder farmers, and improve national food security (Chirwa & Dorward,
2013; Denning et al., 2009). As a result, empirical studies that have sought to
evaluate the programme have done so using indicators that correlate with these
broader objectives. In this section, I present some of the main findings from these
studies and show how they relate to the research objectives of this study.
The programme was introduced, partly, as a response to the recurring
food shortages and the abysmal maize harvest of 2005 (Messina, Peter, & Snapp,
2017). At its inception, the programme targeted at least 50 percent of all small-
holder farmers in the country to receive subsidized fertilizer and improved maize
seedlings. The programme gives qualified farmers coupons for either Hybrid or
Open Pollinated Maize variety seeds and four types of fertilizer. Coupon benefi-
ciaries qualify to redeem their coupons for 2-5 Kg of hybrid maize seed for free,
and two 50kg bags of fertilizer subsidized between one-third to two-thirds of the
market price (Chibwana et al., 2012).
The programme comes at a significant cost to the national budget. The
cost of financing the programme as a percentage of the national budgetincreased
from 5.6 (US$51.4 million) percent in 2005/2006 to about 16.2 percent (US$265.4
million) of the national budget in 2008/2009. (Dorward & Chirwa, 2011). Out of
the total cost in 2008/2009, for instance, international donors provided about 14
percent and the remaining came from the government’s budgetary allocations to
MoAFS (Dorward & Chirwa, 2011).
Despite some criticisms, FISP has been praised as a huge success (Dugger,
2007). Though the magnitude of the gains from maize production is in con-
tention4, the consensus is that maize production has increased considerably af-
4 Messina et al. (2017) reports of an irreconcilable differences between maize production
estimates distributed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO), the Malawi Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) and the National
Statistical Office (NSO) of Malawi.
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ter the programme was introduced (Arndt, Pauw, & Thurlow, 2015; Dorward &
Chirwa, 2011; Messina et al., 2017). Higher maize production, greater alloca-
tions of land to other crops, lower food prices, higher wages, and lower poverty
in rural areas are, therefore, some documented direct and indirect impacts of the
programme (Arndt et al., 2015).
Theoretically, the increased production is expected to raise agricultural
labour demand. The literature suggests that among agricultural households,
changes in input prices may affect household labour decision directly or indi-
rectly (Skoufias, 1994). The direct effect occurs through its impact on the house-
hold shadow profit, and the indirect effect occurs through changes in the shadow
wages of household labour. Thus, the subsidy, coupled with its impact on pro-
duction, is expected to increase agricultural labour demand. However, available
evidence suggests that even though demand for labour increased, this labour may
have been supplied by household members instead of hired labour(Ricker-Gilbert,
2013). Given this evidence, this study contributes to the literature by extending
the evidence on the labour-impact of the programme to by examine its effect on
child labour.
Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2012) found that the impact of the fertilizer
subsidy on annual yield is about $0.69 per household on the average, and about
$1.23 for households in the 90th percentile of total crop output per annum. A
relevant question is how the higher income impacts on real household welfare –
school enrolment, child labour, food consumption, and health status of household
members. On this subject, Chirwa, Matita, Mvula, and Dorward (2011) have
shown through both qualitative and quantitative analysis, that school enrolment
increased among programme beneficiaries. Even though this result is positive
regarding the child’s human capital development, the result does not translate
into a reduction in child labour since most children in sub-Saharan Africa com-
bine school with work. School enrolment differs from educational attainment and
performance, two important factors that could be affected by child labour.
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3.2.1. Conceptual Framework
Figure 3.1 summarizes the main propositions of this chapter on the pathways
through which FISP could affect child labour. The underlying premise of the
figure is that, all other factors remaining the unchanged, fertilizer application and
improved maize variety will increase productivity leading to a higher demand for
farm labour. Given the near agricultural labour market failure in SSA (B. Dillon
& Barrett, 2017), households may rely on its members to supply the additional
labour. This could either increase child labour or have no effect on it depending
on the availability of adult household members. If the household has idle adult
members, then child labour may not be affected. Otherwise, children may have to
work on the farm. Even if the household only uses its adult members, Figure 3.1
shows that child labour could still occur when children have to undertake chores
which adult members had to perform.
Behind the pathways, portrayed in Figure 3.1, are several intervening and
confounding variables that may affect the interaction between FISP and child
labour. For example, the link from hired labour to a reduced child labour depends
on the amount of income realized from the sale of crops. This further depends on
community-level factors like the availability of sales outlets and the transportation
costs. In the empirical section, I control for these intervening factors with the level
of household expenditure and whether there is a market in the community. In
addition, the positive effect of the inputs on production depends on natural factors
like weather and soil quality. With an optimal amount of rainfall, temperature
and other relevant climatic factors, the subsidy will increase productivity, but the
resultant effect on child labour, based on Figure 3.1, depends on the household’s
labour demand. However, even without the subsidized inputs, in a good year with
the right weather, production could also increase which could have the same effect
on child labour as the case of the subsidized inputs. For insurance, FAO (2017)
partly attributes the 2017 increase in maize production to conducive weather
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during the farming season. In the empirical analysis, therefore, controls for the




























The study uses the Malawi Integrated Household Panel Surveys (IHPS) collected
in 2010/2011, 2013 and 2016/2017 by the Malawi National Statistics Office (NSO).
These surveys are part of the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study
– Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) initiative that seeks to provide
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a multi-topic data set, with additional agriculture modules. Therefore, besides
the demographic, economic, and social variables of the households, they are also
representative in terms of size and topics covered. They contain detailed infor-
mation on the agricultural activities of the household, and whether the household
received inputs from FISP in the last wet and/or dry farming seasons. In ad-
dition, the data sets provide information on the time use of household members
from the age of 5 years and above. This provides adequate information on how
the child divided her time between work and other activities. Aside these, there
is information on individual and household characteristics that make it possible
to control for relevant co-variates of child labour that could confound the effect of
FISP. The data, therefore, contains enough information to evaluate the objectives
of this study.
Table 3.1 reports the percentage of households that benefited from the
programme for the sample periods. As a validation, the table also present the
corresponding percentages as reported by NSO (2014). Except for the percentage
of households who either received or redeemed a voucher in 2010/2011, there
are only minor differences between the two values for the respective years. The
differences could be attributed to the variations in sample sizes because of the
data cleaning process. Thus, the table shows that the sample for this analysis
represents the population characteristics regarding the main variables.
Table 3.1.: FISP participation and maize cultivation trends in Malawi
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017
Author NSO Report Author NSO Report Author NSO Report
Percentage of households:
receiving any voucher 59.79 57.73 45.67 46.33 34.99 na
receiving fertilizer voucher 59.70 50.20 44.64 46.20 34.68 na
cultivating maize 96.23 97.03 92.89 94.62 97.07 na
Note: na denotes figures not available in the public report.
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In the empirical analysis, I limit the sample to households that cultivated
maize in either the rainy or the dry season. The focuses on maize farmers is
because the crop is cultivated by most smallholder farmers in Malawi (NSO,
2014). From Table 3.1, between 93 and 97 percent of farmers in the sample
cultivated maize in the 2013/2014 and 2016/2017 seasons respectively. Also, the
subsidized inputs distributed in the respective sample years were mainly improved
maize seeds and fertilizers for maize production.
3.3.2. Measurement of Child Labour and FISP Variables
(i) Child Labour
Even though the ILO’s Convention 138 provides guidelines on the definition of a
child labour, different countries have defined child labour based on their national
circumstance (IPEC & Edmonds, 2008). This makes it difficult to have a universal
definition of child labour. Empirical and theoretical studies on the subject have,
therefore, used different definitions depending on the context and purpose of the
study, and the availability of data (IPEC & Edmonds, 2008). Taking cognizance
of the ILO’s Convention 138, and the domestic laws and regulations in Malawi, I
define child labour as when a person, aged 5 to 13 years, engage in any form of
agricultural or commercial work. Work is defined to include farm and non-farm
work but excludes domestic chores and unpaid apprenticeship (See Table 3.A12
for the set of specific questions which were used to construct the child labour
indicator). I limit the analysis to this age group for two reasons; (i) for this
age group, Malawi’s domestic laws5 mimic the ILO’s Statistical Information and
Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC) criteria6 for child labour; (ii)
the nature of the questions in the IHPS allows to determine child labour for this
5 The Employment Act, 2000 states, among others, that no no person under the age of
fourteen shall be employed or work in any public or private agricultural, industrial or
non-industrial undertaking or any branch thereof. This prohibition excludes work done in
homes, vocational technical schools or other training institutions
6 A child under 12 who is economically active for at least 1 or more hours per week
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age group without strict assumption on whether the work is appropriate for the
age within domestic or international laws.
(ii) The FISP treatment
The FISP variable is measured as a dummy variable that indicates if a household
benefited from the programme. A beneficiary household is defined if a member
redeemed at least one subsidized coupon for inputs. A child(ren) in this household
will, therefore, belong to the treated group. The preference for coupon redemp-
tion instead of receipt is because the receipt of coupons may not influence maize
production if the recipient does not redeem and use it. There is evidence that
some beneficiaries sell their coupons instead of redeeming them. Thus, coupon
redemption will, better capture the effects and benefits of the programme than
just the receipt of the coupons. This notwithstanding, because households some-
times sell part or all of their coupons, coupon receipt could still affect child labour
through the incomes realised from the sales. I, therefore, conduct additional anal-
ysis to test the robustness of the results using coupon receipt as the independent
variable.
3.3.3. Empirical Model and Identification
The correct identification of how FISP affects child labour relies on the strict
exogeneity of the child labour participation equation. An ideal situation to ex-
amine the effect of the programme on child labour would be in a randomized
setting, where the assignment of the treatment is randomized across geographical
and household characteristics. Randomization would eliminate the threat to in-
ternal validity by ensuring that households that are already more likely to engage
in child labour do not self-select into the programme (Ragasa & Mazunda, 2018).
However, as also argued by Ragasa and Mazunda (2018), randomization in this
context would be a very expensive exercise to undertake due to the cost of inputs
and the need to achieve geographical representation. Hence, due to the lack of
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randomization, the internal validity of the result may be questioned, when un-
observed characteristics of the household that affects child labour also determine
programme participation. The present study solves this problem by using three
different econometric techniques to identify the effect of FISP on child labour:
(i) individual fixed effects estimation, (ii) instrumental variable method, and (iii)
Propensity Score Matching technique. The study proceeds with the following
baseline cross-sectional regression models:
Childlabouri = β1 + β2FISPi + Child′iβ3 +HH ′iβ4 + COMM ′iβ5 + i (3.1)
and
Hoursi = α1 + α2FISPi + Child′iα3 +HH ′iα4 + COMM ′iα5 + νi (3.2)
The αs and βs are coefficients to be estimated, HH and Child are vectors of
household and child level control variables which affect child labour in the liter-
ature, COMM is a vector which contains community level controls, and i and
νi are the error terms of their respective models. The variable FISP in equation
(3.1) captures programme participation. Childlabour is an indicator variables
that determine whether the child worked for at least one hour in the last 12
months. Hours is the number of hours that the child worked and it measures the
intensity of child labour.
(i) Instrumental variables method
The causal effect of FISP on child labour depends on the exogeneity of treatment
allocation of the inputs. However, there are several factors that threaten the
exogeneity conditions in this setting. First, there is documentary evidence that
farmers who have political affiliations are favoured in the allocation process. This
means that beneficiaries may have similar characteristics which could bias the
results. One way to deal with this problem will be to include a variable that cap-
tures political affiliation, however, the data does not have a variable that captures
this information. Hence, this may cause omitted variable bias since political affil-
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iation could affect both the treatment and child labour variables. Assuming the
correlation between child labour and political affiliation is negative, and a positive
relation between political affiliation and FISP, we expected the estimated coeffi-
cients, β2 and α2, in equations (3.1) and (3.1) to be biased downwards. Secondary,
measurement errors in the form of non-response or failure of the respondents to
provide the correct answer may also attenuate the effects of FISP in equations
(3.1) and (3.1).
This study uses instrumental variable (IV) estimation (Angrist & Pischke,
2014) to identify the impact of the programme. FISP is instrumented with the
presence of a village development committee (VDC) in the enumeration area. The
IV technique requires that VDC must predict FISP (relevance criteria) and must
not be a significant predictor of child labour (exclusion restriction criteria). The
choice of this variable is mainly informed by the observation in the literature that
the allocation criteria have not been followed over the years. Fisher and Kandiwa
(2014) note that village heads and committee members sometimes allocate the
inputs to their cronies, friends and families. Given the importance of proximity
to network formation, we expect households in communities where the VDCs are
based to have higher chances of benefiting from the programme.
The approach involves two stages of estimation, in the first stage, we regress
the endogenous variable, FISP on the instrument and all the control variables in
equations (3.1) and (3.2). In the second stage, the predicted value of FISP in the
first stage equations replaces the original variable in the child labour participation
equations, (3.1) and (3.2). Equations (3.3)-3.5 illustrates the estimation process:
FIPSi = δ1 + δ2V DC + Child′iδ3HH ′iδ4 + COMM ′iδ5 + ωi, (3.3)
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Childlabouri = pi1 + pi2 ˆFISP i + Child′ipi3 +HH ′ipi4 + COMM ′ipi5 + ηi,
(3.4)
and
Hoursi = θ1 + θ2 ˆFISP i + Child′iθ3 +HH ′iθ4 + COMM ′iθ5 + νi (3.5)
where, equation (3.3) is the first stage regression model, and equations (3.4) and
(3.5) are the second stage models of the participation and intensity of child labour
respectively. ˆFISP is the predicted value of FISP from equation (3.3), pi2 and
θ2 are the coefficients of interest in the final estimations. Appendix 3B provides
formal test of the exogeneity of FISP .
Additional econometric issues arise in estimating equations (3.4) and (3.5)
. First, both Childlabour and FISP are binary variables, hence, estimating equa-
tion (3.4) with a linear probability model in an instrumental variable framework
or a control function method may not be appropriate since both require the error
term, ω, in (3.3) to be normally distributed (Baum, 2016; Baum, Dong, Lewbel,
Yang, et al., 2012; Bontemps & Nauges, 2015). Thus, besides the IV-Probit esti-
mates, I also present results using the special regressor technique7 (Baum, 2016;
Baum et al., 2012; Y. Dong & Lewbel, 2015; Lewbel, 2000; Lewbel, 2007; Lewbel,
2000).
It may be difficult to achieve exogeneity from the proposed instrument.
Though issues of child labour are not among the core mandates of VDCs in
Malawi, their activities may influence the incidence of child labour in their catch-
ment area in some other ways than the subsidised inputs. Thus, the IV estimates
might not be consistent since the assumptions needed to achieve exclusion restric-
tion are too strong to hold. I use individual fixed effects model and propensity
7 Bontemps and Nauges (2015) provides an empirical exposition of the special regressor
61
Chapter 3. Agricultural Subsidies and Child Labour
score matching, two techniques that do not require instrumental variables.
(ii) Fixed effects model
Here, I are assume that the unobserved heterogeneities which could bias the coef-
ficient of FISP is fixed over time. Hence, by introducing individual fixed effects in
the model, these unobserved effect would be adequately netted out. The following
equations outlines the fixed effects model
Childlabourit = γi + β1 + β2FISPit + Child′itβ3 +HH ′itβ4 + COMM ′itβ5 + it
(3.6)
and
Hoursit = λi + α1 + α2FISPit + Child′itα3 +HH ′itα4 + COMM ′itα5 + νit
(3.7)
where γi and λi are the individual fixed effects in their respective equations. it is
an index for individual i in time t. Child, HH, COMM and epsilon and ν are
as in equations (3.1) and 2.2.
(iii) Propensity score matching (PSM)
There could be selection bias If observed and unobserved characteristics of house-
holds are associated with the probability of benefiting from the subsidy. For
instance, officials may award coupons to hard-working farmers to project a suc-
cessful programme. It is also possible for already productive farmers to self-select
into the programmes. Any of these scenarios could bias the effect of FISP on child
labour. PSM overcomes the selection bias by randomizing the co-variates of child
labour across both the treated and non-treated groups. This makes it possible to
get an efficient estimate of the effect of FISP on child labour. Therefore, as an ad-
ditional robustness check, I estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) and the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of FISP using PSM. The method
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involves computing propensity scores for each observation in the treatment and
control groups based on the control variables. Observations in the control and
treatment groups are then matched based on their calculated propensity scores.
The assumption is that if two observations have the same propensity scores inde-
pendent of the treatment, then the difference in their outcomes is because of the
treatment. The following two equation explains the PSM technique:
P (X) = Pr(T = 1|X) (3.8)
P (X) is the propensity score, T is the treatment variable, and X is a vector of the
control variables. Given the estimated probabilities, P (X), the ATT is estimated
as
ATTPSM = EP (X)|T=1 = E[Y T |T = 1, P (X)]− E[Y c|T = 0, P (X)] (3.9)
3.3.4. Summary Description of the Main Variables
This section presents summary statistics of the variables in the analysis. The
study analyses a total sample of 8693 children, comprising 3170 in 2010/2011,
3412 in 2013/2014 and 2111 in 2016/2017. These children come from 1541, 1594
and 1024 households in the respective years. Table 3.2 shows that in all the
sampled periods there were almost as many female children as males, and the
average age is about 9 years. In terms of school enrolment, the statistics show
that the percentage of children in school has increased in Malawi from 79 percent
in 2010/2011 to about 86 percent in 2016/2017. This notwithstanding, 41 and 38
percent of children were engaged in an economic activity in the 2012/2013 and
2016/2017. sample year.
We find in Table 3.2 that most of the children in the sample work in
agriculture related activities. The reason the 2010/2011 estimate of child labour
is smaller is that the definition for the other periods includes all economic activities
performed in the last 7 days and the last 12 months. However, with the 2010/2011
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questionnaire, no question relates to work in agricultural activities in the last
12 months, hence the variable for this period includes only the contributed to
agricultural work during the last 7 days before the survey. In the empirical work,
I control for this problem by including the year fixed effects as additional control
variables. I also present results for the respective cross-sections.
As shown in Table 3.2, the average age of the household head is between
42 and 44 years for the sampled years, and most households are male-headed.
The table further shows that farmers in Malawi are smallholders, with an average
plot size of 2 to 5 acres. On coupon receipt and redemption, Table 3.2 shows that
the proportion of households that received FISP coupons decreased from 59 to 35
percent between 2010/2011 to 2016/2017. In a similar pattern, whilst 58 percent
of households redeemed coupons in 2010/2011, 47 percent in 2013/2014, only 35
percent of the sampled households in 2016/2017 redeemed any coupon. Table
3.2, therefore, shows marginal differences between the receipt and redemption of
coupons.
Table 3.2.: Summary of variables used in the regression analysis
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Child level characteristics n= 3170 n=3412 n=2111
Male child 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50
Child’s age 8.69 2.56 8.90 2.55 9.02 2.53
Child in school 0.79 0.41 0.84 0.36 0.86 0.35
Agricultural work 0.13 0.34 0.41 0.49 0.35 0.48
All work 0.15 0.35 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49
Hours of agricultural work 1.20 4.85 1.03 3.20 0.62 2.96
Hours of all work 1.33 5.20 1.24 4.06 1.07 4.18
Household level characteristics n=1541 n=1594 n=1024
Age of HH head 42.48 12.66 44.12 13.63 43.43 12.54
Male headed HH 0.75 0.43 0.77 0.42 0.75 0.44
HH Head schooled 0.76 0.42 0.79 0.41 0.89 0.31
HH head is married 0.78 0.41 0.80 0.40 0.83 0.38
Household size 5.80 1.95 5.99 1.98 5.97 1.95
HH non-food exp./1000 (MK) 3.73 23.45 8.88 37.31 14.82 60.83
HH plot size 4.55 68.93 2.82 19.50 1.95 1.73
HH social benefits 0.21 0.41 0.43 0.50 0.40 0.49
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Household agriculture exp./1000 (MK) 0.33 1.44 2.13 11.43 2.36 29.36
Market 0.47 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.46 0.50
Community has a primary sch. 0.20 0.40 0.36 0.48 0.09 0.29
Tropic-warm/semiarid 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50
Tropic-warm/subhumid 0.26 0.44 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.45
Tropic-cool/semiarid 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.08 0.28
Tropic-cool/subhumid 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.28
Northern region 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.31
Central region 0.45 0.50 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.50
Southern region 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50
Note: HH=household; MK=Malawian Kwacha (The national currency of Malawi)
3.4. Empirical Findings
3.4.1. Effect of FISP on the Probability of Child Labour
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the average marginal effects of FISP on child labour
in agriculture and overall work (All work) in Malawi. The tables present four
groups of results, one for each cross-section, and last two columns present results
using the panel structure of the data. For each of cross-section, the tables present
estimates of FISP from the Probit, IV-Probit, and the special regression (SR)
models in columns 1 to 9. In the SR models, VDC is the instrument for FISP ,
and the age of the household head is the special regressor. Columns 10 and 11
in each table present the random effects (RE) and the conditional fixed effects
(CFE) estimates of the effect of FISP on child labour.
According to the Probit models, FISP affects the probability of child
labour in agriculture. On the average, the expected difference in the probability
of child labour between those who benefited from the programme and those who
did not is about 5 percentage points in 2010/2011 and 4 percentage points in both
2013/2014 and 2016/2917. Thus, without correcting the endogeneity problem, the
Probit estimates suggest that FISP may account for 38 percent of the observed
occurrence (See the proportion of child labour in Table 3.2) of child labour in
agriculture in 2010/2011, 10 percent in 2013/2014, and 11 percent in 2016/2017.
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The SR model shows that the probability of child labour associated with the
programme is about 11 percentage points higher for children in beneficiary house-
holds compared to those in non-beneficiary households 2010/2011. However, there
is no significant effect of the programme on child labour in Malawi according to
the SR models in columns 6 and 9. From the CFE model, there is a positive
and significant effect of the programme on child labour. The average effect of the
programme on child labour in agriculture is about 5 percentage points.
Similarly, in Table 3.4, the Probit models shows that children from FISP -
redeeming households are associated with a 5-percentage point higher probability
of child labour in 2010/2011 and 2016/2017. The estimated marginal effects
translate to about 35 and 11 percent of the observed child labour incidence in
Table 3.2 for the respective years. However, as observed in Table 3.3 the SR model
estimates a significant effect of a 4-percentage point increase only in 2010/2011.
The average effect of the programme, according to the CFE model, is 5 percentage
points increase for a child whose household redeemed a FISP coupon.
The results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, therefore, show that children from house-
holds which benefit from the programme have a higher probability of working on
farms. This could be because of the direct use of children on maize farms since
the lack of an agricultural labour market limits the ability of the household to hire
an external labour. As the inputs increase productivity and output (Chibwana,
Shively, Fisher, Jumbe, & Masters, 2014; Denning et al., 2009), the marginal
product of the child’s time on the farm increases, and this provides additional
motivation for the parents to increase her time on farm-related activities. In
an economy where farmers use hired labour at an average rate of 2.2 days per
year on the farm (Fisher & Kandiwa, 2014), family members, including children,
are the primary source of labour when there is the need for extra hands. Low
farm mechanisation would further strengthened the demand for child labour on
farms (Malawi Government, 2012; Sheahan & Barrett, 2017).
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Besides the effect of the programme, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show theory-
consistent and policy-relevant estimates of the relationship between some co-
variates and child labour. For example, there is a negative effect of plot size
(landholding) on child labour. The sign of the landholding variable supports the
theoretical argument of Basu and Van (1998) that children from wealthy house-
holds are less likely to engage in child labour, but it contrasts with the empirical
findings of Bhalotra and Heady (2003) and Oryoie et al. (2017) who found that
children from landowning (wealthy) households engage more in child labour. I in-
clude the household’s non-food expenditure as a proxy for income, however, this
variable is insignificant in most of the models.
As discussed in Section 3.2.1, environmental and climatic factors could
confound the effect of FISP on child labour. The empirical estimations, there-
fore, controlled for the effect of climate and other weather factors using the agro-
ecological zone as a dummies as proxies. The result shows that there are regional
and geographical differences in child labour in Malawi. For example, compared
to children in the tropic-warm/semiarid agro-ecological zone, those in the tropic-
warm/sub-humid and the tropic-cool/sub-humid zone are more likely to engage
in child labour. In addition, Table 3.3 further provides regional differences in the
incidence of child labour. According to the CFE model, the incidence of child












Table 3.3.: Average marginal effect of FISP on child labour in agriculture in Malawi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017 Panel
Probit IV-Probit SR Probit IV-Probit SR Probit IV-Probit SR RE CFE
FISP 0.05∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.19 0.04∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.19 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.15) (0.19) (0.02) (0.10) (0.19) (0.01) (0.03)
Male child 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03∗ 0.03∗ 0.02 0.02∗ -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
Child’s age 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Child in school 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.07∗∗ 0.04 0.04 0.09∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.04 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Age of HH head 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male headed HH 0.06 0.08∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.10∗∗ -0.08∗ -0.05∗ -0.05 -0.01 -0.05∗ -0.02 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
HH Head schooled -0.00 -0.05∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Married HH head -0.07 -0.10∗∗ 0.01 0.09∗∗ 0.05 0.09∗∗ 0.03 -0.01 0.09∗∗ -0.03 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Household size -0.01∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
HH non-food exp. -0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HH plot size -0.00∗ -0.00∗∗ 0.00 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
HH social benefits 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.02∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Household agric. exp. 0.00 -0.01∗ -0.00∗ 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00∗∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Market -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗ -0.01 -0.06∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.01 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Primary sch. 0.01 0.04∗∗ 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Tropic-warm/subhumide 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.03∗∗ -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
Tropic-cool/semiaride 0.04∗ 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 -0.10
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08)
Tropic-cool/subhumide 0.05 0.05 0.01∗ 0.05 0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.04 0.03∗ 0.10
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07)
Centralr 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.06∗ -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) (.)
Southr 0.02 -0.00 0.02∗∗ -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.11 -0.02 -0.03∗∗ 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.01) (.)
2013 -0.03 -0.01 0.29∗∗∗ 0.22∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.01) (0.11)
2014 0.28∗∗∗ 0.19
(.) (0.06) (0.13)
2016 -0.06∗ -0.05 -0.05 -0.06∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.27∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.16)
2017 0.28∗∗∗ 0.38
(0.03) (0.23)
Demeaned age of HH head 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.15∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.09) (0.09)
N 3170 3170 3170 3412 3412 2111 2111 2111 2111 9049 3003
McFadden R2 0.09 0.09 0.21
Log pseudolikelihood -1059.68 -3230.33 -1787.61 -4178.43 -1047.00 -2406.10 -4168.56 -429.42
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[0.00] [0.16] [0.04]
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Definitions and measurements of the variables are provided in 3.A11.
e denotes agro-ecological zone with Tropic-warm/semiarid as the reference category. r denotes regional dummies
with the North as the reference category.
RE denotes Random effects Logit; CFE denotes Conditional fixed effects Logit
Table 3.4.: Average marginal effect of FISP on child labour in all work in Malawi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017 Panel
Probit IV-Probit SR Probit IV-Probit SR Probit IV-Probit SR RE CFE
FISP 0.05∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.32 -0.06 0.05∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.19 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.13) (0.03) (0.02) (0.19) (0.17) (0.02) (0.13) (0.16) (0.01) (0.01)
Male child 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03∗ 0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Child’s age 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Child in school 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06∗∗ 0.04 0.03 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Age of HH head 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗ -0.00 0.00∗∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male headed HH 0.04 0.07 0.02∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.08∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.00 -0.06∗∗ -0.01 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
HH Head schooled -0.00 -0.04 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.04 0.10∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.05 0.05∗ -0.01 -0.02
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(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Married HH head -0.08∗ -0.11∗∗ 0.01 0.09∗ 0.06 0.14∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.03 0.08∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Household size -0.01∗∗ -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.01∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
HH non-food exp. -0.00 0.00 0.00∗∗ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HH plot size -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00∗∗ 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
HH social benefits 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.01∗∗ 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.02∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Household agric. exp. 0.00 -0.01 -0.00∗∗ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00∗∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.06∗∗∗ -0.05∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.02 -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Primary sch. 0.01 0.04∗ 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Tropic-warm/subhumide 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.03∗∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Tropic-cool/semiaride 0.04∗ 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Tropic-cool/subhumide 0.05 0.05 0.02∗ 0.07∗ 0.06 0.08∗∗ -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.04∗∗ 0.07
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
Centralr 0.08∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.01 0.07∗ -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.02) (.)
Southr 0.02 0.00 0.02∗∗ -0.02 -0.02 0.06∗∗ -0.08 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 -0.43∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.13)
2013 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.28∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗













Table 3.4 – continued from previous page
2016 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.15∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08)
2017 0.00 0.27∗∗∗ 0.21∗
(.) (0.03) (0.12)
Demeaned age of HH head 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.16∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.14) (0.09)
N 3170 3170 3170 3412 3412 3412 2111 2111 2111 9049 3066
McFadden R2 0.09 0.22 0.21
Log pseudo-likelihood -1138.79 -3313.64 -1785.05 -4177.28 -1081.00 -2439.11 -4269.95 -438.83
Wald test of exogeneity 4.65 1.23 2.64
[0.03] [0.27] [0.10]
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Definitions and measurements of the variables are provided in 3.A11.
e denotes agro-ecological zone with Tropic-warm/semiarid as the reference category. r denotes regional dummies
with the North as the reference category.
RE=Random effects Logit; CFE= Conditional fixed effects Logit
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3.4.2. Effect of FISP on the Probability of Child Labour
Across Household Characteristics
Using the same set of control variables in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the models are esti-
mated for sub-samples of households, differentiated by the gender of the household
head and the size of landholding.8 These variables are two of the criteria which the
committee uses to select programme beneficiaries. The literature, inconclusively,
argues that landholding is an important determinant of child labour (Basu &
Van, 1998; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; Oryoie et al., 2017). Following this empirical
and theoretical discussions, Table 3.5 presents results for households categorized
by the size of their farm plots. Female-headed households are considered in the
literature more vulnerable and poorer (Milazzo & van de Walle, 2017) than male-
headed households, Table 3.5, therefore, further explores the potential differences
between the effect of the programme across female- and male-headed households.
On the heterogeneous effect of the programme on child labour, the results
show that the child-labour effect of FISP is significant among smallholder maize-
farming households (households who cultivate up to 2 acres of land). From the
fixed effects model, the difference in probability of child labour between the bene-
ficiary and non-beneficiary households is about 8 percentage points. Compared to
the corresponding estimate for large-scale farmers (landholding of over 2 acres).
For female- and male-headed households, FIPS increases the incidence of
child labour by about 6 and 7 percentage points. hence, the programme affects
child labour in both types of households. The effect among male-headed house-
holds is, however, marginally greater than female-headed households. Thus, the
results in Table 3.5 suggest that the child-labour effect of the subsidy may cut
across households with different socio-economic characteristics.
8 Instead of interacting FISP with these characteristics, I choose to run separate models
because they provide estimates which are akin to interacting all the control variables with
plot size and gender of the household head. This provides further understanding of how
the different variables affect child labour in each group of household.
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Table 3.5.: Average marginal effect of FISP on child labour in agriculture across
different households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Plot size (acres) Gender of household head
Plot <=2 Plot >2 Male Female
RE CFE RE CFE RE CFE RE CFE
FISP 0.05∗∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.03 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5512 1317 3537 908 7007 2130 580 2042
Log pseudolikelihood -2420.72 -160.06 -1706.05 -133.45 -3178.17 -306.80 -84.80 -979.82
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household,
regional and ecological controls in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are used here.
3.4.3. Effect of FISP on the Probability of Child Labour in
Different Agricultural Activities
An understanding of the activities performed by the working children on farms is
also important for the design of effective measures to mitigate the problem. Using
the same set of control variables in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, Table 3.6 presents the
random and fixed effects estimates of how the programme affects the use of chil-
dren in fertilizer application, weeding, land preparation, planting and harvesting
f crops. The sample size is smaller compared to the those in Tables 3.3 and 3.5
because the information on work is available for only a sub-sample of the children
in the previous tables9
The fixed effects estimates shows no significant impact of the programme
on child labour in any of the three activities. But the observed signs show that
there may be a positive effect on the likelihood of work in weeding/fertilizer ap-
9 The questionnaire allowed households to list only four members of the household who
worked on the farm. I suppose, since respondents listed adult members before children,
some working children were not included in this section because there was not enough space
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plication and land preparation activities. However, the random effects models
estimate that children from beneficiary households may provide labour in weed-
ing and fertilizer application, and land preparation. If these children are used in
fertilizer application then they stand the risk of absorbing poisonous chemical in
the fertilizers which could exacerbate the potential negative effects of child labour
on their well-being (health and their academic performance).
Table 3.6.: Average marginal effects of FISP on child labour in different agricul-
tural activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weeding/Fertilizer application Land Preparation Harvesting
RE CFE RE CFE RE CFE
FISP 0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 0.03∗ 0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2741 355 2741 406 2741 263
Log pseudolikelihood -1640.85 -56.28 -1625.71 -69.87 -1666.62 -77.78
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household,
regional and ecological controls in Table 3.3 and 3.4 are used here. Definitions and
measurements of the variables are provided in 3.A11.
3.4.4. Effect of FISP on the Intensity of Child Labour
Table 3.7 presents the results of the effect of FISP on the intensity of child labour
among children between 5 and 13 years. For each cross-section three models
are estimated, the first set of results columns 1, 3, and 7 which are ordinary
least square models do not correct for the potential endogeneity between FISP
and child labour. The columns 2, 4 and 8 contain 2SLS results that use VDC
as an instrument for FISP . However, 2SLS assumes, in this case, that FISP
is a continuous instead of a binary variable hence although the estimates are
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consistent, they may not be efficient in this context. Besides the OLS, and 2SLS
estimates, therefore, I present results of the treatment effect model (endogenous
binary-variable model) in columns 3, 6 and 9. This model belongs to the family
of instrumental variable models, but it delivers a more efficient result when the
endogenous variable is binary (Bhaumik, Dimova, & Gang, 2016).
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows that in 2010/2011, there was a significant effect
of the programme on child labour. According to the 2SLS estimates, children in
beneficiary households worked for about 4 more hours on farms than those whose
households redeemed no input. However, the TE model gives a smaller effect of
the programme on child labour. Column 3 shows that on the average, a child may
have to work for one and a half hours when the household enjoys the programme.
On the effect of the programme on child labour in all work, both OLS and TE
models estimate a significant effect. According to the model (3), the effect of the
subsidy on the intensity of child labour in all work corresponds to about one hour
and 25 minutes. The results in 2010/2010 models contrast with the insignificant
effect we find in 2013/2014 and 2016/2017 except for TE in column 9 where there
is an effect of FISP on child labour in agriculture.
From the panel models, both the random and fixed effects models provide
a positive effect of the programme on child labour. However, the coefficient is
significant only in the random effect model. The coefficients translate into about
17 minutes in agriculture work and about 15 minutes in all work. The largely
insignificant results in these models could be because of recall bias since respon-
dents may not recollect of how many hours the child worked in the reference
period. Arthi, Beegle, De Weerdt, and Palacios-López (2016) find a significant
recall bias in the estimate of the number of hours in agricultural work gotten in
traditional surveys like the one used in this study.
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Table 3.7.: Effect of FISP on the number of hours of child labour in Malawi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017 Panel
OLS 2SLS TE OLS 2SLS TE OLS 2SLS TE RE FE
Panel A: Hours of child labour in agriculture
FISP 0.73∗∗∗ 3.69∗ 1.42∗∗∗ 0.21 -1.76 -0.25 -0.21 0.17 4.02∗∗∗0.28∗∗∗ 0.17
(0.22) (2.15) (0.27) (0.13)(1.88)(0.32)(0.16)(1.78) (0.40) (0.10) (0.15)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3300 3300 3300 3552 3552 3552 2197 2197 2197 9049 9049
R2 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02
Under iden. LM statistic 11.28 8.61 8.07
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Weak iden. statistic 11.62 9.03 9.53
Panel B: Hours of child labour in all Work
FISP 0.73∗∗∗ 2.64 1.40∗∗∗ 0.04 -2.07 -1.21 -0.15 -6.11 -0.63 0.24∗∗ 0.17
(0.23) (2.27) (0.32) (0.15)(2.09)(2.40)(0.21)(4.77) (0.42) (0.11) (0.15)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3300 3300 3300 3552 3552 3552 2197 2197 2197 9049 9049
R2 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02
Under iden. LM stat. 11.28 8.61 8.07
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Weak iden. statistic 11.62 9.03 9.53
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ indicate significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community,
household, regional and ecological controls in Table 3.3 and 3.4 are used here. Definitions and
measurements of the variables are provided in 3.A11. TE=Treatment effects; RE=Random
effects; FE=Fixed effects
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3.4.5. Effect of FISP on Working Hours Across Different
Household Characteristics
Table 3.8 presents the heterogeneous effect of FISP on the intensity of child
labour across household characteristics. First, the results mimic what we observed
in Table 3.7 in terms of the signs and the significance of the coefficient. There is a
positive effect of the programme on child labour across all categories of households,
however, the coefficients are significant only in the random effects models for
the gender of the household head. On the size of the coefficients, the random
effects estimates translate to about 16 and 24 minutes of additional work hours in
agriculture for children in female- and male-headed households. Thus, the effect
seems larger among female-headed households than male-headed households.
Table 3.8.: Random and fixed effects estimates of the effect of FISP on the number
of child labour hours in agriculture across different households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Plot size (acres) Gender of household head
Plot <=2 Plot >2 Male Female
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE
FISP 0.23 0.10 0.25 0.13 0.26∗∗ 0.11 0.40∗∗ 0.51
(0.14) (0.21) (0.16) (0.32) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) (0.36)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5512 5512 3537 3537 7007 7007 2042 2042
R2 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.06
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance level of
1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household, regional and ecological
controls in Table 3.3 and 3.4 are used here.
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3.4.6. Refinements and Additional Results
This section provides additional results to test the robustness of the results in
Tables 3.3-3.8. Appendix 3F further tests the stability of the coefficients of FISP
using the procedure of Oster (2017).
(i) Propensity score matching estimates
Propensity score matching provides an efficient way to estimate the treatment
effect of a policy intervention when a true experimental data is not available. The
technique can be used when there is there is the likelihood of selection bias due
to non-random assignment of the treatment (Garrido et al., 2014). With FISP ,
aside from the targeting of household with certain characteristics due to the selec-
tion guidelines and criteria, there is also evidence that farmers who, for example,
have political affiliations may have higher chances of enjoying the programme.
Such factors suggest that beneficiaries could be systematically different from non-
beneficiaries. Table 3.9, therefore, estimates the average treatment effect (ATE)
which measures the average effect of the programme, and the treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) which estimates the treatment effect among beneficiaries using
PSM. The results are presented in three panels, A, B and C in Table 3.9 for the
respective sample periods.
Columns 1–4 present the treatment effects on the incidence and intensity
(hours) of child labour in family agriculture, column 5–8 present those for all
forms of work. Within beneficiary households, columns 1 and 5 show that FISP
increases the likelihood that a child may engage in child labour by about 5
percentage points. From columns 2 and 6, the probability of child labour among
children in recipient households is about 5 to 6 percentage points higher than
children in the non-beneficiary group.
Beside the negative ATE in 2016/2017, we observe a similar effect of the
programme on the number of child labour hours. In 2010/2011, among beneficiary
79
Chapter 3. Agricultural Subsidies and Child Labour
groups, an average child works for an additional 38 minutes in agriculture, and
42 minutes in overall work than they would if their families had not relieved the
inputs. In the same period, these children worked for 45 minutes more than a
comparable group of children who live non-beneficiary households. For 2013, the
estimated effect of the programme on child labour among beneficiary households
is much smaller, about 13 minutes, compared to what we observed in 2010/2011.
Table 3.9 shows that the effect of the programme on the intensity of child labour
seems to have diminished between 2010 and 2017. Appendix 3.A tests the common
support/overlap assumption of the propensity scores.
Table 3.9.: PSM estimates of the effects of FISP on child labour
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture (Probability) Agriculture(Hours) All work (Probability) All work (Hours)
ATT ATE ATT ATE ATT ATE ATT ATE
Panel A: 2010/2011
FISP 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.19) (0.20) (0.02) (0.01) (0.20) (0.20)
N 3294 3294 3294 3294 3294 3294 3294 3294
Panel B: 2013/2014
FISP 0.06∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.17 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.10 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.13) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.14)
N 3552 3552 3552 3552 3552 2196 3552 3552
Panel C: 2016/2017
FISP 0.05∗ 0.06∗∗ -0.33 -0.29∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ -0.11 -0.12
(0.03) (0.03) (0.23) (0.13) (0.03) (0.03) (0.26) (0.20)
N 2196 2196 2196 2196 2196 2196 2196 2196
Note: (#) AI robust standard errors. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance level of 1, 5 and 10
percent respectively.
(ii) Results with the kind of coupon redeemed
Table 3.10 provides additional results using the kind of input redeemed as the
treatment variable. The table presents results for the three cross-sections and
80
another set of results using panel models. The households are put into four cate-
gories based on whether they received no input (reference category), fertilizer only,
maize only, or all inputs. According to the conditional fixed effects Logit models,
there is a significant difference in child labour between households that redeemed
only fertilizers and those that redeemed no inputs. Compared to children whose
households did not benefit from any of the inputs, children in fertilizer-redeeming
households have, on the average, about 5 percentage points higher chance of en-
gaging in agricultural work. The effect is smaller, about 3 percentage points for
the incidence of all work in Panel B. Likewise, there is a positive effect of fertilizer
redemption on the number of hours worked in agriculture. According to model
(10) in Panel A, children from fertilizer-redeeming households work for 17 minutes
more than their age mates whose household did not redeem fertilizer.
The cross-section models also show significant differences between the dif-
ferent households. For instance, in 2010/2011, child labour was higher among
beneficiary households than non-beneficiary households. Those who redeemed all
three inputs are about 7 percent more likely to work on the farm than those who
did not. In a similar vein, children whose household got both fertilizer and maize
are more liable to work as compared to those living in households that received
not inputs in 2013/2014. However, there appear to be a limited and inconsis-
tent effects on the number of child labour hours, both in agriculture and overall
work. For examples, whilst there is only a significant difference of about an hour in
agriculture between fertilizer-redeeming household and non-input receiving house-
holds in 2010/2011, we find no statistical significance in 2013/2014, in 2016/2017
the estimates show that there was a negative effect of the programme.
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Table 3.10.: Effect of type of input subsidy on Child Labour in Malawi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017 Panel
Logit Linear
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS RE CFE RE FE
Work Hours Work Hours Work Hours Work Work Hours Hours
Panel B: Child labour in agriculture
Fertilizer only 0.06∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.10 0.05∗ -0.21 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.28∗
(0.02) (0.28) (0.02) (0.17) (0.03) (0.18) (0.01) (0.03) (0.14) (0.17)
Fertilizer+maize 0.05∗∗ 0.39 0.05∗ 0.13 0.02 -0.35∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02 0.06 -0.12
(0.02) (0.25) (0.03) (0.20) (0.04) (0.17) (0.01) (0.02) (0.14) (0.26)
All inputs 0.08∗ -0.18 0.03 0.29 0.06 -0.11 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03 0.16 0.03
(0.04) (0.27) (0.03) (0.19) (0.03) (0.27) (0.01) (0.03) (0.15) (0.30)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comm. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3300 3300 3552 3552 2197 2197 9049 3003 9049 9049
R2 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.02
Log pseudolikelihood -1098.01 -1874.50 -1090.70 -4171.93 -430.03
Panel B: Child labour in all work
Fertilizer only 0.06∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.10 0.05∗ -0.21 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.28∗
(0.02) (0.28) (0.02) (0.17) (0.03) (0.18) (0.01) (0.03) (0.14) (0.17)
Fertilizer+maize 0.05∗∗ 0.39 0.05∗ 0.13 0.02 -0.35∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02 0.06 -0.12
(0.02) (0.25) (0.03) (0.20) (0.04) (0.17) (0.01) (0.02) (0.14) (0.26)
All inputs 0.08∗ -0.18 0.03 0.29 0.06 -0.11 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03 0.16 0.03
(0.04) (0.27) (0.03) (0.19) (0.03) (0.27) (0.01) (0.03) (0.15) (0.30)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comm. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3300 3300 3552 3552 2197 2197 9049 3066 9049 9049
R2 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.02
Log pseudolikelihood -1098.01 -1874.50 -1090.70 -4171.93 -430.03
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance level of
1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household, regional and ecological




This chapter has analysed the effect of agricultural input subsidies on child labour
using data sets from Malawi, a country that has implemented one of the most suc-
cessful, and long-running input subsidy programmes in Africa in recent years. The
chapter uses different econometric techniques(instrumental variable and individual
fixed effect techniques, and the propensity score matching method), and specifi-
cations to identify the causal effects of an agricultural subsidy on the incidence
and intensity of child labour in Malawi.
The results from the analyses suggest that the farm input subsidies may
increase the incidence and intensity of child labour. Chapter 3 further shows
that the effect may cut across households of different socio-economic background.
When farming is grouped into specific tasks, the results indicate that children
from beneficiary households sometimes applied fertilizer. This may put them at
the risk of poisonous chemical absorption. The findings mean that the recent agri-
cultural input subsidy programmes could have unintended negative consequences
on child labour. This may, in the long run, hamper the overall poverty-reduction
programmes and efforts in the country.
The results of the study have policy implications for the future design and
implementation of input subsidy programmes in in the sub-region. The govern-
ment and the various implementing agencies should try to reduce the child-labour
impact of the programme. As part of the monitoring and evaluation process, the
implementers must pay attention to beneficiary households that engage children
in farm activities to the detriment of their health and education. One way to do
this is to tie the programme to positive outcomes like school enrolment and the
academic performance of school-going children in the beneficiary households. In
addition, future implementation of the programme could also add labour saving
inputs to reduce the demand for child labour.
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Appendix
3A. Additional Results with Coupon Receipt
Table 3.A1 provides additional results using the household’s receipt of coupons
instead of redemption as a proxy forFISP . The results are consistent with those
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The signs and magnitude confirms the main findings that
the incidence of child labour may increase when an agricultural household benefits
from the programme.
Table 3.A1.: Effect of coupon receipt on child labour in Malawi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017 Panel (Logit)
Probit SR Probit SR Probit SR RE CFE
Panel A: Effect of Coupon Receipt on Child Labour in Agricultural Work
Received FISP 0.05∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ -0.02 0.04∗ 0.20 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.19) (0.02) (0.19) (0.01) (0.03)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3170 3170 3412 3412.00 2111 2111 9049 3003
R2 0.09 0.09 0.21
Log pseudo-likelihood -1058.43 -1786.36 -1048.46 -4167.90 -427.60
Panel B:Effect of Coupon Receipt on Child Labour in all Work
Received FISP 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.04∗∗ -0.05 0.06∗∗ 0.22 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.17) (0.02) (0.19) (0.01) (0.02)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3170 3170 3412 3412 2111 2111 9049 3066
R2 0.09 0.22 0.21
Log pseudo-likelihood -1138.95 -1784.51 -1079.89 -4268.75 -436.90
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household,
regional and ecological controls in Table 3.3 and 3.4 are used here.
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3B. Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test of Endogeneity of FISP
Before proceeding to with the regression analysis, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is
used to test the exogeneity of theFISP in equation(3.1) (Durbin, 1954; Hausman,
1978; Wu, 1973). The null hypothesis of the test is that FISP is exogenous in
equations (3.1) and (3.2). A rejection of the null means that the variable is
endogenous in the child labour participation equation, hence, there is the need
for a techniques that can take care of the endogeneity problem (Baum, Schaffer,
Stillman, et al., 2003). In Table 3.A2, two versions of the test conclude that FISP
is endogenous in the child labour equation. The null hypothesis is rejected in the
sample periods.
Table 3.A2.: Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity of FISP
Test Statistic 2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017
Wu-Hausman F-test:
F-statistic 9.156 4.67 7.53
df F(1,3278) F(1,3530) F(1,2175)
p-Value [0.003] [0.031] [0.006]
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 test:
χ2 9.19 4.69 7.58
df χ2(1) χ2(1) χ2(1)
p-Value [0.002] [0.030] [0.006]
H0: Regressor (FISP ) is exogenous
3C. Tests of the Common Support and Overlap Assump-
tion of the Propensity Scores
Figure 3.A shows the densities of the predicted probabilities that a FISP ben-
eficiary is a non-beneficiary over different propensity scores. Two observations
in the figure indicate that the common support or overlap assumption is not vio-
lated. First the the distribution of the estimated probabilities of the two groups of
households overlap each other, and second, none of the plots are concentrated near
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zero and one. A further test of the balancing property confirms that balancing
property is also satisfied.
.3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
Fig A1: Region of Common Support (2010/2011)
.2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
Fig A2: Region of Common Support (2013/2014)
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated
Fig A3: Region of Common Support (2016/2017)
Figure 3.A.: Overlap Plots of Propensity Scores
Table 3.A3.: Propensity score matching quality test
Year Sample Pseudo R2 χ2 p-Value Mean bias
2010/2011 Unmatched 0.022 98.73 0.000 10.3Matched 0.001 5.54 0.698 2.2
2013/2014 Unmatched 0.026 128.77 0.000 12.1Matched 0.001 3.48 0.901 2.3
2016/2017 Unmatched 0.023 65.28 0.000 9.6Matched 0.006 12.82 0.118 4.3
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3D. Effect of FISP on Child Labour-Children Between 5 to
17 Years
This section provides additional results using the full sample of children from 5
to 17 years to reproduce the main results in the study. The results in Tables
3.A4-3.A8 show that the effect of FISP on child labour remains almost the same
even when we use the 5–17 definition of a child.
Table 3.A4.: Average marginal effect of FISP on child labour (5-17 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017 Panel
Probit SR Probit SR Probit SR Logit-RELogit-CFE
Panel A: Average Marginal Effect of FISP on Child Labour in Agriculture work
FISP 0.05∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.19 0.04∗∗ 0.26 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02∗
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02) (0.19) (0.01) (0.01)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4170 4170 4559 4559 2909 2909 12115 4941
McFadden Adj R2 0.11 0.11 0.27
Log pseudolikelihood -1642.81 -2247.85 -1451.60 -5739.56 -653.77
Panel B: Average Marginal Effect of FISP on Child Labour in All Work
FISP 0.06∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.13 0.05∗∗ 0.19 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02) (0.18) (0.01) (0.01)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4170 4170 4559 4559 2909 2909 12115 4975
McFadden Adj R2 0.12 0.29 0.27
Log pseudo-likelihood -1765.27 -2215.26 -1449.42 -5809.63 -661.84
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household,
regional and ecological controls in Table 3.3 and 3.4 are used here. Definitions and
measurements of the variables are provided in 3.A11.
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Table 3.A5.: Average marginal effect of FISP on child labour in agriculture across
different households (5-17 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Plot size (acres) Gender of Household Head
Plot <=2 Plot >2 Male Female
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE
FISP 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04 0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comm. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7270 2170 4845 1500 9283 3485 2832 955
R2
Log pseudolikelihood -3312.59 -257.07 -2365.63 -211.40 -4380.89 -469.20 -1342.45 -121.79
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household,
regional and ecological controls in Table 3.3 and 3.4 are used here. Definitions and
measurements of the variables are provided in 3.A11.
Table 3.A6.: Average marginal effects of FISP on child labour in different agricul-
tural activities (5-17 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weed/Fertilizer Land Preparation Harvesting
RE FE RE FE RE FE
FISP 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community ontrols Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4958 951 4958 977 4958 823
R2
Log pseudo-likelihood -2773.97 -220.41 -2726.86 -207.70 -2953.48 -235.06
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household,
regional and ecological controls in Table 3.3 and 3.4 are used here. Definitions and
measurements of the variables are provided in 3.A11.
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Table 3.A7.: Effect of FISP on the hours of child labour in Malawi (5-17 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
201/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017 Panel
OLS 2SLS TE OLS 2SLS TE OLS 2SLS TE RE FE
Panel A: Effect on Hours of Child Labour in Agriculture
FISP 0.87∗∗∗ 6.79∗∗ 0.30∗ -1.48 -0.10 1.75 0.37∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.25) (2.87) (0.18) (2.47) (0.17) (1.98) (0.12) (0.18)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4341 4341 4341 4744 4744 4744 3028 3028 3028 12113 12113
R2 0.07 -0.21 0.11 0.08 0.05 -0.02 0.07 0.03
UnderID LM Stats 10.33 9.48 6.62
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
Weak ID F-statistic 10.71 9.87 7.30
Panel B: Effect on Hours of Child Labour in All Work
Redeemed coupon 0.86∗∗∗ 4.57 0.05 -1.67 0.07 -4.01 0.29∗∗ 0.15
(0.27) (3.09) (0.21) (2.66) (0.25) (4.96) (0.14) (0.18)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4341 4341 4341 4746 4746 4746 3028 3028 3028 12115 12113
R2 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.08 -0.05 0.09 0.03
UnderID LM Stats 10.33 9.47 6.62
[0.00] [0.00] [.01]
Weak ID F-statistic 10.71 9.87 7.30
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance level of
1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household, regional and ecological
controls in Table 3.3 and 3.4 are used here. Definitions and measurements of the variables are
provided in 3.A11.
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Table 3.A8.: Effect of FISP on the number of hours of child labour in Malawi
(5-17 years)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Plot size (acres) Gender of Household Head
Plot <=2 Plot >2 Male Female
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE
FISP 0.15 0.25 0.20 -0.32 0.13 -0.16 0.58∗ 0.13
(0.24) (0.74) (0.32) (0.79) (0.22) (0.54) (0.32) (0.92)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Comm. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2899 2899 2028 2028 3478 3478 1449 1449
R2 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.09
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance
level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same child, community, household,
regional and ecological controls in Table 3.3 and 3.4 are used here.
3E. First Stage Result of IV-Probit Models
Table 3.A9.: First stage results
(1) (2) (3)
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017
Male child 0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Child’s age 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Child in school 0.01 0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Age of HH head 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male headed HH -0.07 0.01 -0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
HH Head schooled 0.12*** -0.00 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Married HH head 0.09 0.05 0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Household size -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HH non-food exp. -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
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Table 3.A9 – continued from previous page
HH plot size 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.02*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
HH social benefits -0.01 0.06** 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Household agric. exp. 0.03*** 0.00 0.00***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Market -0.04 0.00 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Primary sch. -0.10*** 0.04 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
Tropic-warm/subhumid -0.03 0.01 0.18***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Tropic-cool/semiarid 0.10** -0.05 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Tropic-cool/subhumid -0.02 0.01 0.20
(0.06) (0.06) (0.14)
Central -0.08 -0.10* 0.26**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.13)






VDC 0.14*** 0.12** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Constant 0.16 0.12 -0.43**
(0.10) (0.17) (0.18)
N 3170 3412 2111
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Definitions
and measurements of the variables are provided in 4.A4.
e denotes agro-ecological zone with Tropic-warm/semiarid as the reference category.
r denotes regional dummies with the North as the reference category.
3F. Stability of the Coefficients
Table 3.A10 tests the stability of the coefficients against bias from potential un-
observables explanatory using the procedure of Oster (2017). This test relies on
the movement of the coefficient to draw conclusions on the possible bias that may
arise due to the omission of unobservables. By successively including control vari-
ables that have explanatory power in a model, the R2 of the model is expected
to increase, however, if the increase in R2 leaves the coefficient unchanged, then
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it can be concluded that even if the unobservables were included, the coefficient
might not change significantly (Oster, 2017).10. The procedure is used to test
whether the observed coefficients of FISP suffers from omitted variables bias that
could change the sign and significance of the coefficient.The test assumes that
the researcher has already included most of the important control variables. The
procedure formalises the approach of heuristically determining the robustness of a
coefficient from its movement because of the inclusion of control variables. Oster
(2017) argues that given a coefficient of proportionality δ we can approximate the
level of bias by:
β∗ = β˜ − δ[β˚ − β˜]Rmax − R˜
R˜− R˚ (3.10)
where β∗ is the bias adjusted coefficient. β˜ and R˜ are the coefficient of interest
and the R2 from the complete model with all the control variables in equations
(3.1) and (3.2), β˚ and R˚ are the coefficient and R2 from the model with FISP as
the only explanatory variable. Rmax is the maximum R2 obtainable if all control
variables were to be included. And δ denotes the coefficient of proportionality
that shows the relative importance of the unobserved characteristics in relation
to the observed characteristics. The higher the value of δ the more importance
we attach to the unobservables. For instance, δ = 1 implies equal selection so
the unobservables are assumed to be equally important as the included control
variables.
The essence of equation (3.10) is to determine which value of delta will
produce an estimated treatment effect of zero. Oster (2017) suggests an upper
bound of δ = 1, which means that the unobservables could only be as important as
the observables. Hence, if the estimated effect is different from zero for δ = 1 then
the coefficient is considered as robust. The second parameter to be determined is
Rmax, for this Oster (2017) suggests an Rmax = ΠR˜. Here Oster (2017) proposes
a Π of 1.3.
10 Arnold, Freier, Pallauf, and Stadelmann (2016) and Birthal, Roy, and Negi (2015) provide
a recent application.
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However, Table 3.A10 uses Π = 0.3 since the recommended value tends to
be too small compared to the R˜ in one of the models. Table 3.A10, therefore,
reports the bias-adjusted coefficients using Rmax = .3 for different values of δ.
The table contains two panels of results one for the models that estimate the
probability of labour in Panel A, whilst Panel B presents that of the intensity of
child work. For determining the robustness of the coefficients of FISP , the last
row of each panel δ = 1 is of interest. Because the test is only appropriate for
linear models, I estimate the linear probability version of the respective binary
models in Table 3.4. For easy reference, I attach the respective coefficient of FISP
to the bias-adjusted estimates in parentheses.
Panel A of the Table 3.A10 shows that, if included all possible explana-
tory variables of child labour, under the condition that δ = 1, we may still esti-
mate a robust coefficient of the programme on child labour. However, the figures
show that the bias-adjusted coefficient is smaller than the estimated coefficients
in parentheses. The magnitude of the difference shows that the estimates of in 3.4
may suffer, marginally, from omitted variable bias. Hence, we can conclude that
our estimates of the effect of FISP on child labour in Table 3.4 are robust. Panel
B provides the same conclusions on the effect of the programme on the intensity
of child labour.
Table 3.A10.: Stability of the FISP coefficients with Varying δ
Delta (δ) value (1) (2) (3)
2010/2011 2013/2014 2016/2017
β∗ β∗ β∗
Panel A: Based on columns 1, 4 and 7 of Table 3.4
δ=0.25 0.038 0.034 0.049
δ=0.50 0.029 0.033 0.048
δ=0.75 0.020 0.032 0.047
δ=1.0 0.010 [0.05∗∗∗] 0.032[0.04∗] 0.046[0.05∗∗]
Panel B: Based on columns 1, 4 and 7 of Panel B in Table 3.7
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Table 3.A10 – continued from previous page
δ=.25 0.562 -0.016 -0.326
δ=.50 0.413 -0.073 -0.505
δ=.75 0.234 -0.134 -0.711
δ=1.0 0.015[0.73∗∗∗] -0.198[-2.07] -0.955[-6.11]
Note: Rmax=.30. [#] coefficient of FISP from Tables 3.4 and 3.7 ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate
significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
The results in Panel A are based of the linear probability model counterparts of
columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 3.3 since the the test is only suitable for linear models.
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Table 3.A11.: Definition and measurement of variables
Variable Measurement Meaning Definition
FISP Dummy Did the household redeem coupon? Yes=1; No=0
Male child Dummy Sex of child Male=1; Female=0
Child’s age Discrete Age of child Years
Child is in school Dummy Is the child currently in school? Yes=1; No=0
HH head’s age Discrete Age of household head Years
HH head’s is male Dummy Sex of household head Male=1; Female=0
HH head edu. Dummy Has the household ever been to school? Yes=1; N=0
HH head is married Dummy Is the household head married? Yes=1; N0=0
Household size Discrete The number of people in the household Number of people
Non food expenditure Continuous Household expenditure on non-food Malawian Kwacha
Plot size Continuous Size of household land Acres
Social safety dummy Dummy Does the household benefit from any social safety net? Yes=1; No=0
Agriculture expenditure Continuous Amount spent on rent and purchase of agriculture assets Malawian Kwacha
Comm. has market Dummy Does the community have a market? Yes=1; No=0
Comm has primary sch. Dummy Does the community have a primary school? Yes=1; N0=0
95
Chapter 3. Agricultural Subsidies and Child Labour
Table 3.A12.: Questions used to construct the child labour indicator and number
of hours worked
Question Response
In the last 12 months, did you work on household agricul-
tural activities (including farming, raising livestock or fish-
ing, whether for sale or for household food) even if only for
one hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
In the last 12 months, did you run a non-farm business of
any size for yourself or the household, even if only for one
hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
In the last week, did [NAME] help without being paid in any
kind of business run by this house-hold, even if it was only
for one hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
In the last 12 months, did you work as an employee for a
wage, salary, commission, or any payment in kind: including
doing paid apprenticeship, domestic work or paid farm work,
excluding ganyu, even if only for one hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
In the last 12 months, did you engage in casual, part-time
or ganyu labour, even if only for one hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
How many hours in the last seven days did you spend
on household agricultural activities (including livestock and
fishing-related activities) whether for sale or for household
food?
Hours
How many hours in the last seven days did you run or do any
kind of non-agricultural or non-fishing household business,
big or small, for yourself?
Hours
How many hours in the last seven days did you help in any
of the household’s non-agricultural or non-fishing household
businesses, if any?
Hours
How many hours in the last seven days did you engage in
casual, part-time or ganyu labour?
Hours
How many hours in the last seven days did you do any work






Relative Deprivation and Child
Labour1
1 This is an individual project to evaluate the effect of relative deprivation on child labour
in Africa.
Acknowledgements: I am very grateful to the participants of the 2017 summer research
seminar of the Economics Department, University of Bayreuth for their helpful comments.
I thank Clifford Afoakwah, David Stadelmann, Elena Groß, Emmanuel Orkoh, Isaac Koom-
son, Jacob Novignon, Raymond Kofi-Nti for their insightful comments at various stages of
the chapter.
97
Chapter 4. Relative Deprivation and Child Labour
Abstract
Child labour is often conceived as an absolute poverty phenomenon; however,
empirical evidence shows that the problem has persisted in the face of a signifi-
cant reduction in poverty in several developing countries. Using a representative
sample of 5442 from the Malawi Integrated Household Survey, this study tests the
hypothesis that subjective poverty is a significant determinant of child labour. The
potential endogeneity between subjective poverty and child labour is addressed by
employing instrumental variables. The results that child labour increases when
the household thinks it is poorer than its neighbours and friends. The findings of
the study mean that policies that seek to reduce poverty such as conditional cash
transfers and input subsidies should consider their impact on relative deprivation,
and child labour.
Keywords: Child labour; Malawi; Poverty; Subjective Poverty; Relative Poverty.
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4.1. Introduction
Child labour is a major developmental challenge facing developing countries. In
sub-Saharan Africa alone, about 72 million (20 percent) of the children were en-
gaged in child labour in 2016 (ILO, 2017b). Most of these children work on cocoa,
tobacco and sugarcane plantations in various countries. They work as both paid
labour and unpaid contributing family workers. Some tasks assigned to these
children are hazardous according to international conventions2. Because of its
negative effects on long-term economic growth, the elimination of the worst forms
of child labour has been stated as an explicit target of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals’ roadmap for eradicating poverty (UN, 2016; USDOL, 2016).
A significant amount of the literature suggests that poverty is, perhaps, the
foremost determinant of child labour (Basu & Van, 1998). This idea suggests that
we should expect child labour to decline when there is appreciable income growth.
However, the rate of decline of child labour is below what is expected from the
steady poverty reduction in developing countries (Sarkar & Sarkar, 2015). This
raises questions about the importance of monetary poverty as a determinant of
child labour (Basu & Van, 1998). Following Bhalotra and Heady (2003), who
found that children from land-rich (a measure of wealth in most developing coun-
tries) households are more likely to engage in child labour, other empirical studies
have failed to find support for the luxury axiom (Kruger, 2007; R. Ray, 2000).
For example, Kruger (2007) found that a higher income leads to an increase in
child labour in Brazil. Even though adherents of the luxury axiom have used the
‘wealth-paradox’ to explain contrary findings, not all, as noted by Dwibedi and
Marjit (2017), of the contrary results can be explained by the wealth-paradox.
The results of these studies, coupled with the persistence of child labour despite
the steady reduction in poverty across developing countries, call for a deeper un-
derstanding of the causes of child labour beyond monetary poverty.
2 About 85 million children worldwide, were engaged in hazardous labour in 2012 (ILO &
IPEC, 2013)
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The aim of this chapter is to estimates the effect of relative deprivation on
child labour and contribute to the broader discussion of the non-pecuniary deter-
minants of the problem. The chapter derives its motivation from the theoretical
findings of Dwibedi and Marjit (2017), and the empirical works of Fafchamps
and Shilpi (2008) and Ravallion and Lokshin (2010), which show that subjective
poverty has significant effects on the household’s well-being and child labour. Ac-
cording to these studies, some of the household’s decisions are either a direct or
an indirect response to observed differences between their level of consumption
and that of their neighbours. This is done to optimise the gap between their own
material well-being and that of their neighbours to maximise utility (happiness).
The utility-maximising strategy results in either a decrease or an increase in the
supply of child labour depending on the net effect of child labour on a household’s
utility. The net effect of child labour on overall household welfare may be deter-
mined by the difference between the utility from additional consumption due to
the child’s income and the dis-utility from child labour.
Whether relative poverty leads to an increase in child labour or not de-
pends, also, on the household’s aspirations regarding the child’s education and
future expectations. If poorer households see the education of their wards as
the means to escape poverty, then these households may demand more schooling
and less child labour for their wards. However, if the costs of education and the
economic conditions are not favourable, then these households may send their
children to work to increase current consumption. Thus, the relationship between
subjective poverty and child labour is open for empirical investigation.
Despite the importance of the relationship between relative deprivation
and child labour, research on the subject is sparse. With the notable exception
of the theoretical work of Dwibedi and Marjit (2017), there is little empirical
work on this relationship. This chapter, therefore, contributes to this strand of
the literature by analysing the effect of relative deprivation on child labour. The
aim of the study is important given the volume of studies that have questioned
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the significance of absolute poverty as a determinant of child labour (Bhalotra &
Heady, 2003; Kruger, 2007; R. Ray, 2000; Sarkar & Sarkar, 2015).
This chapter studies the relationship between relative deprivation and child
labour using a Malawian dataset. The study concentrates on Malawi for two
reasons, first, there is a comprehensive microdata that has questions on the
household’s subjective well-being. Second, despite the various international con-
ventions3 that the country has ratified, and the domestic laws against the prob-
lem, child labour is still a major socio-economic problem in Malawi. According
to the 2015 Malawi National Child Labour Survey, about 48 percent of all chil-
dren from 5 to 17 years were economically active, 20.9 percent of them engaged
in hazardous activities (ILO & NSO, 2017). The United States Department of
Labor also estimates that about 20 percent of children in Malawi are engaged in
worse forms of child labour (USDOL, 2016). The report cites working on tobacco
farms, fishing, and sexual exploitation as some predominant activities of children
between 5 and 14 years. These activities expose Malawian children to several risks
including nicotine absorption and sexually transmitted diseases.
4.2. Literature Review
This section situates the study in the broader discussion on the role of hope,
aspirations and inequality in household decision making. Human aspiration is
influenced by culture, and the outcomes of complex interactions within an indi-
vidual’s network (Appadurai, 2004; Manski, 2000; D. Ray, 2006). One outcome
of such interactions is the awareness of one’s position relative to other members
of society, and this leads to the evolution of aspirations. For example, Genicot
and Ray (2017) argue that aspirations, income, and its distribution co-evolve such
3 According to USDOL (2016) Malawi has ratified the following international conventions:
(1) ILO Convention 138, Minimum Age; (2) ILO Convention 182, Worst Forms of Child
Labour; (3) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN-CRC); (4) UN-CRC Optional
Protocol on Armed Conflict; (5) UN-CRC Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child
Prostitution and Child Pornography and Palermo Protocol on Trafficking in Persons
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that they influence each other.
According to this literature, relative deprivation provides a reference point
(a social norm, or some perceived average of the subject) for the individual to
classify outcomes into two groups, a good or a bad. A bad outcome occurs when
the level of consumption (or any other welfare measure) falls below the threshold,
whiles a good outcome is when consumption is above the threshold (Genicot &
Ray, 2017; Mo, 2014). If the household finds itself in a bad outcome, it tries to
optimise welfare by allocating resources including labour. Such labour allocation
decisions may involve the distribution of the child’s time between education and
work.
We can analyse the decision to send children to work because the household
feels deprived with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and
with the altruistic model of Basu and Van (1998). In a two-period setting, If
the household sees favourable prospects of the child, then relative deprivation
in the current period may induce more investment in the child’s education and
leisure in the present period since parents expect higher remittance from the
child in period two. An unfavourable outlook, however, could induce more child
labour to maximise current consumption. Depending on the social norms, and
altruism, child labour could have a welfare-reducing effect on the households. In
this setting, the household may choose less child labour even if it feels deprived.
This is a rational strategy to increase both its utility and social status. Thus,
the relationship between relative deprivation and child labour is not determined
apriori.
Studies in economics and other social sciences have examined the effect
of subjective well-being on the household’s decision, consumption, and happi-
ness (Davis, 1959; Easterling, 1974; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2008; Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
2005; Graham & Felton, 2006; Pavot, Diener, & Suh, 1998; Ravallion & Lok-
shin, 2010). The increased interest in the topic is due to its potential to provide
insights into questions on what makes people happy, and how economic agents
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allocate their resources to maximise satisfaction subject to their relative sta-
tus in the neighbourhood. A large body of the literature on the subject shows
that an individual’s level of consumption and the happiness derived from it, is
partly influenced by the consumption levels of their neighbours (Asadullah &
Chaudhury, 2012; Easterling, 1974; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2008; Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
2005; Ravallion & Lokshin, 2010). This observation implies that the consump-
tion/income of a reference group may influence the decisions and resource alloca-
tions of individuals and their households (Andreoni & Scholz, 1998; Bandiera &
Rasul, 2006; Charness & Grosskopf, 2001; Collewet, de Grip, & de Koning, 2017;
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Woittiez & Kapteyn, 1998). A natural extension of this
literature would, therefore, be analyses of the household decisions that are affected
by subjective deprivation, and the trade-offs that are involved when the house-
hold increases its consumption to the socially optimal level. This study, therefore,
contributes to this literature by analysing how child labour supply responds to
the household’s level of relative deprivation.
The theoretical findings of Dwibedi and Marjit (2017) motivate the ob-
jectives of this chapter. In this work, the authors analysed the effect of relative
income on child labour. The findings of their study show that the supply of child
labour could increase even when the economic conditions of the household improve
in absolute terms but fall in relation to the average neighbourhood income. Thus,
the authors conclude that relative deprivation is an important determinant of
child labour. Despite the volume of literature on the economic and non-economic
determinants of child labour, empirical work on the relationship between rela-
tive deprivation and child labour is scanty. This notwithstanding, the findings
of some previous studies are relevant for this work. The first of these studies is
Ravallion and Lokshin (2010). In their paper, the authors used the Malawi In-
tegrated Household Survey (IHS) to examine whether relative deprivation is an
important determinant of the household’s welfare. They find that even though
relative deprivation is not a dominant concern among most of their sample, well-
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off households, in both rural and urban areas, tend to be concerned about their
relative position in the society.
The findings of their paper support the notion that deprivation could serve
as a source of demotivation to individuals. First, individuals at the bottom of the
social ladder may be indifferent about what happens in society (C. A. Smith &
Kirby, 2001; H. J. Smith & Pettigrew, 2014). Such individuals may, therefore,
not respond to further changes in their relative deprivation. If this assertion holds
then we may not expect any child-labour effect of relative deprivation among poor
households.
Much of the studies on the relationship between subjective deprivation and
human welfare has been done with data sets from developed countries. For ex-
ample, in Germany, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) finds that people are happier when,
in comparison with their neighbours, they have a larger income. Therefore, to
test whether the observed relationship between the two variables is a universal
human trait or an artefact of a prosperous market-oriented lifestyle. The second
study, Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008), used data set from a remote area in Nepal
to test whether isolated households care less about their relative consumption.
The paper further investigates whether poor households care less about relative
consumption than the non-poor. The study rejects the argument that poor house-
holds in isolated communities care less about the consumption of their neighbours.
Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008), therefore, conclude that sensitivity to relative depri-
vation is a common human trait, hence the results could be generalised to other
settings. This means that irrespective of the level of poverty and market orien-
tation, relative deprivation may matter for household welfare. The relevance of
their results to the current study is that even in Malawi where the average income
is low, relative deprivation may still be an important determinant of household




Data for the study is the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS), which
the Statistical Office of Malawi (NSO) collected in 2013 as part of the World
Bank Living Standards Measurement Study – Integrated Surveys on Agriculture
(LSMS-ISA) initiative. The aim of the survey was to provide the government
and stakeholders variables to evaluate and monitor the conditions of Malawian
households, to foster evidence-based policy formulation, and monitor the coun-
try’s progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the goals
of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) (NSO, 2014). The
data, therefore, contains comprehensive information on households socio-economic
and demographics characters, including consumption and non-consumption ex-
penditure, household labour supply, economic and non-economic shocks, sources
of livelihood and agricultural activities.
Besides the variables on the household demographics, economic, and hous-
ing characteristics, the survey collected data on the labour supply of individuals
aged five years and above. This makes it possible to determine if a child worked
in the last 12 months. The data set is suitable for this study because it contains
questions on the subjective assessment of the poverty status of the household,
its neighbours and friends, hence, there is information to construct a proxy for
relative deprivation.
4.3.2. Definition of Variables
(i) Subjective deprivation
Subjective deprivation is constructed from three questions relating to the house-
hold’s assessment of its well-being, and the well-being of its friends and neighbours.
The enumerator asked a person with adequate information on the household or
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the available respondents to assess the poverty status of the household, its friends
and neighbours using the six-scale ladder in Appendix 4.A1. The accompanying
questions to Figure 4.A1 are: Imagine six steps, where on the bottom, the first
step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the sixth, stand the rich;
(i) On which step are you today? (ii) On which step are most of your neighbours
today? and (iii) On which step are most of your friends today? I use the answers
to these questions to construct two proxies, one for the difference between the
well-being of friends and that of the household (RD-friends), and the other for
the difference between the well-being of neighbours and that of the household (
RD-neighbours ).
Most theoretical studies on happiness and relative deprivation consider a
utility function of the form Ui = u(yi, (yi/Y ∗i )). Where yi is a measure of wealth
or income of the individual, the term yi/Y ∗i captures relative deprivation, and Y ∗
is the average income of the reference group (Verme, 2009). In empirical work,
Y ∗ could be proxied with the average income of a defined group. However, there
is a lack of agreement in the literature on the best way to define such a reference
group (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). The literature does not provide clear guidelines
on whether the reference household should include all other households in the same
community, district or region; or whether it should include only households with
similar characteristics (such as the educational status, gender of the household’s
head, occupational and poverty status of the household) within these geographical
boundaries. For example, van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer (1985) defined
the reference group based on the observed characteristics of education, age and
employment status. Yet, Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) combined these definitions in
his study.
The appeal of this study’s measure of relative deprivation is that the nature
of the questions allows the household to define its own reference group. Hence,
there is no need for the researcher to make strict assumptions regarding demo-
graphic and geographical characteristics to define an ex-ante representative house-
106
hold. In addition, by adopting this definition, the study provides a natural ex-
tension to the previous related studies that have used these variables in similar
settings (Cojocaru, 2016; Ravallion & Lokshin, 2010).
(ii) Child labour
The study proxies child labour with a dummy variable that shows whether, a
person from 5 to 13 years, worked in the last 12 months before the survey. The
variable takes a value of 1 if a child worked for at least one hour or more in either
agricultural or commercial activities. Table 4.A5 contains the full set of questions
used to construct the child labour indicator. Thus, a child engages in child labour
if she answered yes to any of the questions in Table 4.A5. The definitions of work
and child in this study are consistent with Malawi’s domestic laws and regulation4
on child labour and, international conventions covering the minimum age for work.
For example, ILO’s Convention 138 stipulates that a child, under the age of 12
years engages in child labour in A child under 12 who is economically active for
at least one or more hours per week. The set of questions is also consistent with
definitions used in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis as well as other empirical studies
on child labour (Ali, 2018; Frempong & Stadelmann, 2018).
4.3.3. Empirical model and identification
(i) Empirical model
To evaluate the effect of relative deprivation on child labour, I estimate the fol-
lowing child-labour participation equations:
ChildWorkedi =α1 + α2lnexpi + α3RD-friendsi + Child′iα4 +HH ′iα5
+ COMM ′iα6 + i (4.1)
4 The Employment Act, 2000 states, among others, that no person under the age of four-
teen shall be employed or work in any public or private agricultural, industrial or non-
industrial undertaking or any branch thereof. This prohibition excludes work done in
homes, vocational-technical schools or other training institutions
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and
ChildWorkedi =γ1 + γ2lnexpi + γ3RD-neighboursi + Child′iγ4 +HH ′iγ5
+ COMM ′iγ6 + νi (4.2)
where lnexp, the logarithm of the household’s expenditure, captures the ma-
terial well-being (actual consumption level of the household) of the household.
RD-friends is the difference between the subjective well-being of the friends of
the child’s household and that of the household itself, and RD-neighbours is the
difference between the subjective well-being of the neighbours of the child’s house-
hold and that of the household itself. Child is a vector of child characteristics
including the age, gender, health in the last two weeks preceding the survey, and
whether she is in school. HH is a set of household characteristics, and COMM
is a vector of community-level variables.
(ii) Identification
To identify the effect of relative deprivation on child labour, the two variables,
RD-friends and RD-neighbours must be exogenous in the child labour partic-
ipation equation. However, the coefficients of these variables in equations (4.1)
and (4.2) may suffer from endogeneity bias. The source of endogeneity, in this
case, is the likely bi-causal relationship between child labour and relative depri-
vation. The theoretical literature (Basu & Van, 1998) shows that an altruistic
parent/household may derive dissatisfaction/dis-utility from child labour, hence
such a household may consider itself to be subjectively poor if it has an econom-
ically active child. Thus, we expect such a household with a child labourer to
report a lower position in Figure 4.A1. Therefore, if the endogeneity is not cor-
rected, we may have an inverse relationship between the two variables. Empirical
evidence also suggests that child labourers contribute to their household’s income,
as a result, child labour may affect the level of consumption in the household. If
any of these situations hold, then the observed coefficients, α3 and γ3, in equations
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(4.1) and (4.2) could not be interpreted as the causal effect of relative deprivation
on child labour.
Hence, instead of estimating a Probit model, equations (4.1) and (4.2)
are estimated with the IV-Probit model. The IV-Probit model uses a two-stage
estimation technique, where, in the first stage, relative deprivation is regressed
on the set of control variables in equations (4.1) and (4.2) and an additional
instrumental variable. The instrumental variable must satisfy the relevance and
exogeneity conditions. To meet the relevance criteria, the proposed variable(s)
must significantly explain relative deprivation. The exogeneity condition means
that the instrumental variable(s) must not be (i) a significant predictor of child
labour, and (ii) it should only indirectly influence child labour through its effect
on relative deprivation.
The study uses the educational status of the father of the household’s
head, and whether the head’s father or mother is alive as instruments for relative
deprivation and household expenditure. The choice of these variables is premised
on the results of different studies that have shown a positive effect of parental
education on their children’s earnings (Dubow, Boxer, & Huesmann, 2009) so we
can expect the education status of the grandparents to predict the current income
of the child’s parents. This is because educated parents are more likely to provide
their children with better education and hence higher income. In addition, the
literature also shows that the death of a parent(s) could have a significant negative
consequence on the well-being of their adult children (Glatt, 2018; Marks, Jun,
& Song, 2007; Stokes, 2016). Therefore, Therefore, I argue that whilst there is a
direct effect of parental education and death on the well-being of adult children,
such a relationship may not exist for the child labour status of the grandchild.
The IV-Probit estimates of α3 and γ3 are implemented in two stages, in
the first stage, equation (4.3) and (4.4) estimate RD-friends and RD-neighbours
as functions of the instruments and the control variables in equations (4.1) and
(4.2) as:
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RD-friendsi =pi1 + pi2grandparentedui + pi3grandparentalivei + Child′ipi4
+HH ′ipi5 + COMM ′ipi6 + ζi (4.3)
RD-neighboursi =τ1 + τ2grandparentedui + τ3grandparentalivei + Child′iτ4
+HH ′iτ5 + COMM ′iτ6 + i (4.4)
and
lnexpi =φ1 + φ2grandparentedui + φ3grandparentalivei + Child′iφ4
+HH ′iφ5 + COMM ′iφ6 + ψi (4.5)
then, in the second stage, the child labour participation equation is estimated as a
function of the predicted values of lnexp and relative deprivation from equations
(4.3) and (4.4) as
ChildWorkedi =β1 + β2 ̂lnexpi + β3 ̂RD-friendsi + Child′iβ4 +HH ′iβ5
+ COMM ′iβ6 + ωi (4.6)
and
ChildWorkedi =θ1 + θ2 ̂lnexpi + θ3 ̂RD-neighboursi + Child′iθ4 +HH ′iθ5
+ COMM ′iθ6 +$i (4.7)
where grandparentedu is the education status of the grandparent of the child,
grandparentalive is a dummy variable which indicates whether at least one of
the grandparents is alive. ̂RD-friends and ̂RD-neighbours in equations (4.6)
and (4.7) are the predicted values of relative deprivation from (4.3) and (4.4)
respectively, and ̂lnexp is the predicted value of household expenditure from esti-
mating equation (4.5).
4.3.4. Summary Description of the Main Variables
Table 4.1 presents a summary description of the main variables used in the anal-
ysis. The rate of child labour, according to Table 4.1, is 23 percent. The average
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household thinks they are on step 2 of the six-step ladder, while their neighbours
are on step 2.37 and 2.54. About 47 percent of Malawian household think their
friends have higher well-being, and another 44 percent of them think their neigh-
bours are better off. According to Table 4.1, the average household expenditure
in the sample is MK119,553.55($766)5. The table further shows that about 93
percent of the sampled households engage in farming. It is, therefore, possible
that most of the children work in agriculture since the sector employs most of the
child labourers in Malawi. About 75percent of the children live in the male-headed
household.
Table 4.1.: Summary statistics of main variables
Variable Mean (N= 5442) SD
Child labour 0.23 0.42
Total real annual consumption per capita MK119,553.55 102,270.43
On which step is the household today? 2.04 0.90
On which step are your neighbours today? 2.37 1.02
On which step are your friends today? 2.54 1.08
Neighbours are better off 0.44 0.50
Friends are better off 0.47 0.50
Male child 0.51 0.50
Child’s age 10.33 3.59
Child is in school 0.83 0.38
Child was ill in last 2 weeks 0.13 0.34
Biological child of the HH head 0.82 0.39
Age of HH head 45.26 14.06
Male-headed household 0.75 0.43
No. of male HH mem. <=14 1.37 1.24
No. of male HH mem. 15-19 0.35 0.62
No. of male HH mem. 20-59 0.75 0.71
No. of male HH mem. >=60 0.09 0.29
No. of female HH mem. <=14 1.36 1.26
No. of female HH mem. 15-19 0.30 0.56
No. of female HH mem. 20-59 0.87 0.65
No. of female HH mem. >=60 0.13 0.34
Agricultural household 0.93 0.26
Comm. has primary sch. 0.34 0.47
Comm. has a secondary sch. 0.02 0.15
Average distance to road 9.80 10.19
No. of shocks suffered by HH 4.23 2.48
HH resides in an urban area 0.13 0.33
HH resides in the northern region 0.10 0.30
5 The dollar equivalent is calculated with the 2011 exchange from the World Bank’s Official
exchange rate (Local currency unit per US$ for 2011)
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
HH resides in the central region 0.46 0.50
HH resides in the southern region 0.44 0.50
HH is in tropic-warm/subhumid 0.28 0.45
HH is in tropic-cool/semiarid 0.14 0.34
HH is in tropic-cool/subhumid 0.05 0.23
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the distribution of the household’s assessment of
their well-being, and their assessment of their friends and neighbours’ well-being.
About 38 percent of the respondents who think their household is on step 1 also
think their neighbours are on the same step of the ladder, 43 percent of them said
their neighbours are on step 2, whilst only 1 percent put their neighbours on the
6th step of the ladder. Those who think they are on the 6th step reported that
none of their neighbours is on step 1 or 2, however, the majority (57.9 percent)
of this group said they are in the neighbourhood of households who are on step
5 or 6. Most of the households think their neighbours are a step below or above
them on the ladder. For instance, among those on step 3, about 37 said other
households in their neighbourhood are on step 2 and 19 percent on step four. In
summary, Table 4.A1 shows that about 20 percent of household think they enjoy
higher welfare than their neighbours, 36 percent have the same welfare as their
neighbours, and another 44 are worse compared to their neighbours.
Table 4.3 also shows that people choose friends who share similar charac-
teristics with them. For instance, 40 percent of step 1 households believe their
friends are on step 1, 36 and 18 percent put most of their friends on steps and 2
and 3. In summary, only 13 percent of all households believe their welfare level
is better than their friends, however, 41 percent think they have the same welfare
as their friends, and 46 believe they are worse off. This could bias the coefficient
of relative deprivation in the econometric models.
Figure 4.1 compares the respondents’ assessments of their households with
their assessments of their friends and neighbours’ welfare. The figure also presents
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the prevalence of child labour across the levels of self-assessed poverty. To generate
Figure 4.1, I generated two dummy variables to capture whether the household is
poorer than its neighbours and friends. First, a household is classified as poorer
than its neighbours if the respondent puts her household on a lower step than
its neighbours. A richer household is the one which thinks it has higher welfare
than its neighbours. We observe from the figure that the proportion of poor
households (in comparison with both friends and neighbours) falls as subjective
welfare increases. For example, 61 percent of households in step 1 think their
neighbours are richer, but the figure decreases to 12 and zero percent for those on
steps 4 and 5, whilst 60 percent of the poorest think their friends are richer, none
of the richest group thinks they are poorer than their friends.
Table 4.2.: Distribution of neighbours’ poverty by household’s poverty
On which step is your household? Total
Step 1 2 3 4 5 6 %
% % % % % %
On which step
are most of your
neighbours?
1 38.34 13.36 6.36 2.54 0.00 0.00 18.16
2 42.97 39.16 37.38 23.73 16.67 0.00 38.68
3 13.42 38.13 29.67 31.36 33.33 14.29 28.47
4 2.88 6.51 19.27 27.97 27.78 28.57 9.94
5 1.28 2.17 6.17 11.86 22.22 28.57 3.65
6 1.12 0.68 1.16 2.54 0.00 28.57 1.11
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164
Table 4.3.: Distribution of friends’ poverty by household’s poverty
On which step is your household? Total
Step 1 2 3 4 5 6
% % % % % % %
On which step
are most of your
friends?
1 39.94 8.45 5.20 2.54 5.56 14.29 16.45
2 36.26 45.09 24.66 11.86 0.00 0.00 35.30
3 17.57 34.59 37.57 25.42 22.22 14.29 29.71
4 3.99 9.02 24.08 33.05 38.89 0.00 12.71
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Table 4.3 – continued from previous page
5 1.28 1.94 6.55 19.49 27.78 14.29 4.07
6 0.96 0.91 1.93 7.63 5.56 57.14 1.76
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164 2164
On the association with child labour and subjective welfare, Figure 4.1
shows that much of the child labour cases are concentrated among the poor group.
For instance, 24 percent of children from households on the lowest step worked
within the reference period, the respective figures for the second and third steps
are 26 and 20 percent. However, a bivariate result of the nature in Figure 4.1 is
susceptible to confounding variables and endogeneity which makes it difficult to
find any effect if it exists. In the regression analysis, I take care of these problems
by including relevant control variables, and instrumental variables to estimate the
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Figure 4.1.: Relative Deprivation and Child Labour across Self-assessed Poverty
Status
4.4. Empirical Findings
4.4.1. Effect of Relative Deprivation on Child Labour
Table 4.4 presents the estimates of equation (4.1), (4.2), (4.6), and (4.7). In
columns 1 and 2, the independent variable of interest is the difference between
the household and its neighbours’ poverty, RD-neighbours, that of its friends,
RD-friends, are presented in columns 3 and 4. Columns 1 and 3 present the
marginal effects of the Probit estimates whilst columns 2 and 4 present the IV
Probit estimates.
The Probit estimates show that the effect of relative deprivation on child
labour is negative and significant. Because of how the variables were created,
this means that child labour falls as the households consider itself to be poorer
than its neighbours or friends. Theoretically, this result is tenable since house-
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holds could be motivated by their perceived deprivation to invest in the future
of their children by sending them to school. The reduction in child labour could,
therefore, be a direct strategy by the households to shore up its image in society.
However, because of the threat of endogeneity, the Probit estimates may not be
the exogenous effect of relative deprivation on child labour. Thus, the marginal
effects in columns 1 and 3 may only be taken as the correlation between the two
variables (like what is shown in Figure 4.1).
Columns 2 and 4, therefore, use instrumental variables (the education sta-
tus of the household’s head’s father, and whether his/her father and mother are
alive) to isolate the exogenous effects of relative deprivation and household expen-
diture on child labour. After including several relevant control variables, and the
level of the household’s subjective poverty, the marginal effects of RD-friends
and RD-neighbours in columns in 2 and 4 show that both forms of deprivation
have an increasing effect on child labour in Malawi. Thus, a household is more
likely to engage a child in child labour if it thinks it is deprived compared to
its friends and neighbours. The size of the coefficients means that a one-point
difference between the position of neighbours and the household in Figure 4.A1
increases the probability of child labour by about 15 percentage points. The same
point difference between friends and the household increases the probability of
child labour by about 22 percentage points.
An explanation of the observed relationship is that the households use
child labour to raise additional income to increase consumption. Earlier studies
have shown that income from child labour makes up a significant proportion of the
income of poor households in developing countries (Bandara et al., 2015; Koomson
& Asongu, 2016). This means that the additional income from child labour, and
the associated consumption and utility/satisfaction is more than enough to offset
the dis-utility that the household may drive from it. The positive net utility from
child labour is expected because, in Malawi most households do not make enough
to ensure subsistence. Hence, the need for immediate consumption may be higher
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than concerns about the adverse effects of child labour.
On the effect of household expenditure on child labour, the results show
that an increase in the household’s total expenditure may increase child labour.
However, the coefficient is significant only in column 2. The results, therefore,
show that an exogenous increase in household expenditure may increase child
labour in Malawi. This result lends support to the poverty-child labour hypothesis
which is explained by the altruistic axiom of Basu and Van (1998). According to
the coefficient of log expenditure, at the means of the other variables, a 10 percent
increase in expenditure translate into about a 0.04 percentage points increase in
the probability that the child will work.
Some of the control variables also have significant effects on child labour. For
instance, an increase in the general prices of goods and services is associated with
a higher incidence of child labour in Malawi. This effect is consistent with the
conclusion of Frempong and Stadelmann (2018), Hou et al. (2015), and the main
findings in Chapter 2. Thus, households engage in child labour when the cost of
living goes up. Consistent with the observation that majority of the child labour
cases involve agricultural or farm work, Table 4.4 shows that children who live in
farm households and those in rural areas have a higher probability of child labour
as compared to those in non-farm households or urban areas.
Some authors have argued that reducing the cost of education could be an
effective means to reduce child labour (Canagarajah & Nielsen, 2001; Canagarajah
& Nielsen, 1999). In the estimations, I control for access to education with two
dummy variables that capture primary and secondary schools in the community.
The signs and the insignificance of the coefficients of these variables show that ac-
cess to schools is associated with a lower incidence of child labour. Children in the
communities that have primary schools have a lower probability of child labour.
This results further show that communities that have secondary schools have
lower child labour incidence. Thus, reducing the cost of education by increasing
access could reduce child labour in Malawi.
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On the effects of environmental factors on child labour, I include a set
of dummy variables as proxies for the different agro-ecological zones in Malawi.
The ecological zones are defined to reflect the major climatic variations across
the country, hence, they capture important weather conditions like rainfall and
temperature. Table 4.4 shows that there are significant differences between child
labour across the different agro-ecological zones. Compared to children in the
tropic-warm/semiarid (the omitted zone), the estimates show that children in
both the tropic-warm/sub-humid and the tropic-cool/sub-humid zones are more
likely to work. Since both the tropic-warm/sub-humid and the tropic-cool/sub-
humid receives more moisture and can support crop production than the tropic-
warm/semiarid (HarvestChoic, 2010), this finding supports the notion that child
labour is an agricultural phenomenon in Malawi. For instance, a child who lives in
tropic-warm/sub-humid region is about 4 percentage points more likely to engage
in child labour than a child with similar characteristics in tropic-warm/semiarid.
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Table 4.4.: Average marginal effects of relative deprivation on child labour in
Malawi
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Log HH expenditure 0.00 0.22∗ 0.00 0.11
(0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.17)
Subjective well-being -0.02∗∗ 0.04 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.07
(0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.07)
Male child 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Child’s age 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Child in school -0.02 -0.03∗ -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ill last 2 weeks 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Child of head 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Age of HH head 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male headed household -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
HH head’s years of schooling -0.00 -0.01∗ -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
No. of male HH members <=14yrs -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of male HH members 15-19yrs -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of male HH members 20-59yrs 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of male HH members >=60yrs 0.05∗∗ -0.01 0.05∗∗ 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
No. of female HH members <=14yrs -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
No. of female HH member 15-19yrs 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of female HH members20-59yrs -0.02∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
No. of female HH members >=60yrs 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Agricultural household 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.10∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)
Community has primary school -0.02∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.03
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(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Community has a secondary school -0.16∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Log price index 0.55∗∗∗ 0.48∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.44
(0.11) (0.26) (0.11) (0.32)
Distance to road -0.00 0.00∗ -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
No. of shocks suffered by HH 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Urban HH -0.28∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10)
HH is in Central regionr 0.01 -0.05∗ 0.02 -0.06∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
HH is in Southern regionr 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
HH is in tropic-warm/subhumid zonee 0.04∗∗ 0.03∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH is in tropic-cool/semiarid zonee -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH is in tropic-cool/subhumid zonee 0.05∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
N 5442 5442 5442 5442
Log pseudolikelihood -2500.73 -13707.04 -2491.83 -14030.58
McFadden’s R2 0.15 0.15
Wald test of exogeneity 10.86 32.82
[0.00] [0.00]
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Definitions
and measurements of the variables are provided in 4.A4. HH denotes households e
denotes agro-ecological zone with Tropic-warm/semiarid as the reference category.
r denotes regional dummies with the North as the reference category.
The estimated marginal effects of the relative poverty variables and house-
hold expenditure may not be an accurate representation of their true effects since
they are continuous variables (Williams, 2017a, 2017b). Panels (a) and (b) of
Figure 4.2 plot the probability of child labour against relative deprivation with
respect to neighbours and friends respectively from columns 2 and 4 in Table 4.4.
The essence of the graph is to provide an idea of the curvature of the effects of the
two variables at their different values. Panel (a) shows an upward-sloping curve
for RD − neighbours, which means that the magnitude of the effect increases as
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the level of subjective deprivations increases. Similarly, Panel (b) also shows that
the child-labour effect of subjective deprivation with respect to friends increase as
the perceived difference widens. This means that the need to raise additional re-
sources through child labour to meet the consumption levels in the neighbourhood
increases with the magnitude of relative deprivation.
It is also interesting to note that the graphs flatten off their upper and lower
ends. At the lower end are the subjectively rich households, who may be content
with their level of consumption and assets. Hence, these households may care
less about the level of consumption of their friends and neighbours. The upper
parts of the graphs are those households who think their positions are lower than
the rest of society. The curvature of the graphs at this point also shows that
these households may have already given up because, in their view, it may be
impossible to catch up with their neighbours. Here, we could not expect relative
deprivation to have any more effect on the household’s decision concerning child
labour. Deprived people may respond to their situation with sadness in which
case they are likely to withdraw or be indifferent to changes in their surroundings
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Panel (b): Difference between friend’s?s and self?assessed well−being
Figure 4.2.: Average Marginal Effects of RD-neighbours and Household Total Ex-
penditure on Child Labour
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4.4.2. Refinements and Additional Results
(i) Sub-sample results for cases where the respondent is either the household’s head
or the spouse of the head
The validity of the results in Table 4.4 depends on whether the respondent to the
subjective deprivations questions takes part in the household’s decision making. If
she does not take part in the general decisions of the household, especially those
concerning the child’s time, her views may not necessarily affect the decision
process in the household. This may happen if, for example, her views about the
welfare of the household differs from that of the decision maker. Thus, to identify
the true effect of relative deprivation on child labour we need the assessment of
the major decision maker in the household. In Table 4.5, I rely on the assumption
that household heads and their spouses are the decision makers of the households
to restrict the sample to the cases where the respondent is the household. In all
221 respondents were non-household heads, hence they were excluded from the
analysis. I then run models 1-4 in Table 4.4 using this restricted sub-sample of
the data.
The coefficients in Table 4.5 are consistent with those in Table 4.4. First,
the results reveal that without correcting for endogeneity, relative deprivation
seems to reduce the incidence of child labour. However, although the results in
columns 1 and 2 are plausible, they could also be driven by the bi-causal relation-
ship between child labour and relative deprivation. Hence, the IV-Probit estimate
is more credible since it is able to correct the endogeneity between the two vari-
ables. According to the IV-Probit estimate in Table 4.5 for every step that the
household falls below its friends, the probability of child labour increases by about
16 percentage points. The effect of relative deprivation regarding neighbours is
also significant and positive. The results show that on the average the probabil-
ity of child labour increases by about 18 percentage points if the household the
household thinks it falls below their neighbours.
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Table 4.5.: Average marginal effects of relative deprivation on child labour in
Malawi
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Log HH expenditure 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.11
(0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.14)
Subjective well-being -0.02∗∗∗ 0.05 -0.03∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06)
Male child 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Child’s age 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Child is in school -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ill last 2 weeks 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Child of HH head -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Age of HH head 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male headed household -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH head’s years of schooling -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
No. of male HH members <=14yrs -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of male HH members 15-19yrs -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of male HH members 20-59yrs 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of male HH members >=60yrs 0.06∗∗∗ -0.00 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
No. of female HH members <=14yrs -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
No. of female HH members 15-19yrs 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of female HH members 20-59yrs -0.02∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.02 -0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of female HH members >=60yrs 0.03∗ 0.01 0.03∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Agricultural household 0.15∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
No. of shocks suffered by HH 0.00 0.00∗ 0.00 0.00
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(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Community has a primary school -0.02 -0.04∗∗ -0.02 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Community has secondary school -0.16∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Log price index 0.58∗∗∗ 0.42∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗
(0.12) (0.24) (0.12) (0.23)
Distance to road -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Urban HH -0.28∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07)
HH is in Central regionr 0.01 -0.05 0.02 -0.05∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
HH is in Southern regionr 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
HH is in tropic-warm/subhumid zonee 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH is in tropic-cool/semiarid zonee -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
HH is in tropic-cool/subhumid zonee 0.06∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
N 5221 5221 5221 5221
Log pseudolikelihood -2385.26 -13112.42 -2375.27 -13395.54
McFadden’s R2 0.15 0.16
Wald test of exogeneity 10.47 20.59
[0.01] [0.00]
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Definitions
and measurements of the variables are provided in 4.A4. HH denotes households e
denotes agro-ecological zone with Tropic-warm/semiarid as the reference category.
r denotes regional dummies with the North as the reference category.
(ii) Relative deprivation, child labour and the location of residence
In this section, I examine whether the effect of relative deprivation on child labour
among rural households differs from urban households. This question is in line
with the suggestions in the literature that isolated households may care less about
relative deprivation than households and individual in market-oriented commu-
nities (Cox, 1987; Fehr & Falk, 2002; Inglehart & Klingemann, 2000; Ravallion
& Dearden, 1988). If this assertion is true, then relative deprivation should have
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a lower effect on child labour in rural areas than in urban areas. In Table 4.6,
I partitioned the sample into two sub-samples, rural and urban households and
perform the regression analysis using the same set of control variables. Accord-
ing to the results, the household’s deprivation in relation to its neighbours has a
significant effect on child labour in both urban rural areas. The effect of depriva-
tion regarding friends is insignificant in both groups of households. In each case
where RD-neighbours is significant, the effect on the probability of child labour
is about 25 percentage points. Thus, this sample provides no evidence to suggest
that relative deprivation has a larger effect on child labour in urban areas than
rural. The coefficient of log expenditure also shows that the effect of expenditure
on child labour appears to be larger for rural children than it is for urban children.
Table 4.6.: Average marginal effects of relative deprivation on child labour -
Residence of the child
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rural residence Urban residence





Log HH expenditure 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4302 4302 1140 1140
Log pseudolikelihood -10459.94 -10459.94 -3005.14 -3005.14
Wald test of exogeneity 114.56 114.56 46.14 46.14
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ indicate significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same, child, household and
community controls, as well as, ecological zone and region fixed effects, as those Tables 4.4 and
4.5.
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(iii) Relative deprivation, child labour and the gender of the child
Table 4.7 further partition the sample into boys and girls to examine how the
effects of relative deprivation on child labour differ according to the gender of the
child. The table shows that the male child’s probability of child labour increases by
28 and 19 percentage points when the household feels poorer than their neighbours
and friends. However, the variables have no significant effect on girls.
Table 4.7.: Average marginal effects of deprivation on child labour-Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys Girls





Log HH expenditure 0.01 -0.08 0.37∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.21) (0.16) (0.12)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2712 2712 2730 2730
Log pseudolikelihood -6950.17 -6832.78 -7029.30 -6826.33
Wald test of exogeneity 104.43 7.42 12.94 12.65
[0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ indicate significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same, child, household and
community controls, as well as, ecological zone and region fixed effects, as those Tables 4.4 and
4.5.
4.5. Conclusion
This study has analysed the effect of relative deprivation on child labour deci-
sion. The empirical section uses questions on subjective welfare from a publicly
available Malawian dataset to answer the research question of the study. Two vari-
ables, the household’s poverty status regarding friends and neighbours are used
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to proxy relative deprivation. To correct for the endogeneity between relative de-
privation and child labour, the education status of the child’s grandparents and
whether they are alive are used to instrument relative deprivation and household
expenditure.
The results of the study show that, after controlling for actual expenditure,
perceived relative deprivation is still a significant input in the household’s child-
labour decision. The study finds that the probability of child labour falls if the
household thinks it is richer than it neighbours and friends. Thus, this study
finds support for the relative deprivation hypothesis which states that, besides
absolute income, relative income also affects the household’s utility and utility
maximisation decisions. In addition to this finding, some control variables provide
interesting policy-relevant results. For instance, we find that an increase in the
male wage rate is associated with a reduction in a child in Malawi.
The contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is that it pro-
vides empirical evidence of the effect of relative deprivation on child labour. The
study contributes to the broad discussion in the literature and policy spheres on
the importance of non-monetary determinants of child labour. In Malawi, there is
empirical evidence that the government’s agricultural input subsidy programme
has an effect on subjective poverty. Hence, this chapter has shown that the effect
of the programme on child labour, as observed in Chapter 3 may be re-enforced
through its effects on relative deprivation. In terms of policy relevance, the find-
ings of the study mean that the households’ perception of income poverty is an
important determinant of child labour. Thus, contrary to the received literature
that ignores the effect of relative deprivation in child labour analysis, the results
of the study mean that any development policy that is neutral to the relative
deprivation concerns may be less effective in addressing child labour.
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Appendix
4A. Aid for Subjective Welfare Assessment
Figure 4.A1.: Poverty Ladder for Household Self Assessment
Source: NSO, 2013
4B. Distribution of Households According to their Com-
parison with their Friends and Neighbours






4C. Effect of Relative Deprivation on Child Labour accord-
ing to Gender of the Household Head
Table 4.A2 presents results for female- and male-headed households. Using the
same set of controls and instruments, the table does not show many differences
between in the coefficient between the two sub-groups. This notwithstanding, the
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result shows that whilst, subjective deprivation regarding a neighbour is significant
in predicting child labour among male-headed households, female-headed rather
respond to deprivation regarding their friends.
Table 4.A2.: Effect of subjective deprivation on child labour -Gender of household
head
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male-headed household female-headed household
Boys Girls





Log HH expenditure 0.14 0.13 0.26∗ 0.17
(0.29) (0.27) (0.15) (0.20)
Child controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ecological Zone fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4139 4139 1303 1303
Log pseudolikelihood -10435.42 -10679.77 -3145.75 -3222.16
Wald test of exogeneity 3.38 24.57 52.99 20.41
[0.18] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ indicate significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. The same, child, household and
community controls, as well as, ecological zone and region fixed effects, as those Tables 4.4 and
4.5.
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4D. First Stage Results From the IV-Probit Models
Table 4.A3.: First stage results
RD-neighbours RD-friends log expenditure
Subjective well-being -0.63*** -0.48*** 0.22***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Male child -0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Child’s age -0.02 -0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Child is in school -0.00 0.01 0.08***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Ill last 2 weeks 0.03 -0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Child of HH head 0.05 0.01 -0.05**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Age of HH head -0.00*** 0.00 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Male headed household=1 0.03 0.19*** 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
HH head’s sch. years 0.02** 0.02*** 0.05***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Male headed household=1 # HH head’s sch. years -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.01***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
No. of male HH mem. <=14 0.00 0.01 -0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of male HH mem. 15-19 -0.00 -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
No. of male HH mem. 20-59 -0.04* -0.03 0.04***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
No. of male HH mem. >=60 0.25*** -0.02 0.05
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03)
No. of female HH mem. <=14 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of female HH mem. 15-19 0.01 0.03 -0.05***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
No. of female HH mem. 20-59 0.03 0.05** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
No. of female HH mem. >=60 0.06* 0.05 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Agric household 0.00 -0.05 -0.11***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
No. of shocks -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Comm primary sch. 0.03 0.02 0.11***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Comm.seondary sch. 0.02 0.24*** 0.17***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
Log price index 1.23*** -0.00 -1.05***
(0.26) (0.29) (0.14)
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Dist. road -0.01*** -0.00 -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Urban HH 0.20** 0.38*** 0.33***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.05)
Central 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.11***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
South 0.37*** 0.27*** -0.06*
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03)
Tropic-warm/subhumid -0.12*** -0.11*** 0.07***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Tropic-cool/semiarid -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Tropic-cool/subhumid -0.13** 0.09 -0.09***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
Head’s father schooled 0.07* 0.05 0.08***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
head’s father is alive -0.09*** -0.03 0.05***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Constant -3.79*** 1.29 15.56***
Note: (#) Standard error, clustered at the household. [#] p-value of test statistic. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and
∗ indicate significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Definitions and measurements
of the variables are provided in 4.A4.
e denotes agro-ecological zone with Tropic-warm/semiarid as the reference category. r denotes













4E. Definition of Variables Used in the Regression Analysis
Table 4.A4.: Definition and measurement of variables
Variable Measurement Meaning Definition
Child labour Dummy The child worked in the last 2 weeks No=0; Yes=1
Subjective well-being Discrete On which step is the households Count
Log HH expenditure Continuous logarithm of household expenditure log units
RD-friends Discrete Subjective deprivation with reference to neighbours
RD-neighbours Discrete Subjective deprivation with reference to friends
Male child Dummy Sex of child Female=0; Male=1
Child’s age Discrete Age of child Years
Child in school Dummy Is the child currently in school? No=0; Yes=1
Ill last 2 weeks Dummy Child was ill in the last 2 weeks No=0; Yes=1
Child of head Dummy Biological child of the head No=0; Yes=1
Age of HH head Discrete Age of household head Years
Male headed household Dummy Sex of household head Female=0; Male=1
No. of male HH mem. <=14 Discrete No. of male members less than 14 years count
No. of male HH mem. 15-19 Discrete No. of male members from 15-19 year count
No. of male HH mem. 20-59 Discrete No. of male members from 20-59 year count
No. of male HH mem. >=60 Discrete No. of male members from 60 years and above count
No. of female HH mem. <=14 Discrete No. of female members less than 14 years count
No. of female HH mem. 15-19 Discrete No. of female members from 15-19 year count
No. of female HH mem. 20-59 Discrete No. of female members from 20-59 year count
No. of female HH mem. >=60 Discrete No. of female members from 60 years and above count
Agricultural household Dummy The household cultivated crops No=0; Yes=1
Comm primary sch. Dummy Community has a primary school No=0; Yes=1
Comm. has a secondary sch. Dummy Community has a secondary school No=0; Yes=1
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Table 4.A4 Definition and measurement of variables– continued from previous page
Average distance to road Continuous Average distance from community to road Kilometres
No. of shocks Discrete Number of adverse shocks suffered by the household Count
Urban HH Dummy Housheold is located in an urban area No=0; Yes=1
North region Dummy Household resides in the northern region No=0; Yes=1
Central region Dummy Household resides in the Central region No=0; Yes=1
South region Dummy Household resides in the Southern region No=0; Yes=1
Tropic-warm/subhumid Dummy Household resides in the subhumid zone No=0; Yes=1
Tropic-cool/semiarid Dummy Household resides in the semiarid zone No=0; Yes=1
Tropic-cool/subhumid Dummy Household resides in the subhumid zone No=0; Yes=1
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4F. Questions Used to Construct the Child Labour Indica-
tor
Table 4.A5.: Questions used to construct the child labour indicator
Question Response
In the last 12 months, did you work on household agricul-
tural activities (including farming, raising livestock or fish-
ing, whether for sale or for household food) even if only for
one hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
In the last 12 months, did you run a non-farm business of
any size for yourself or the household, even if only for one
hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
In the last week, did [NAME] help without being paid in any
kind of business run by this house-hold, even if it was only
for one hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
In the last 12 months, did you work as an employee for a
wage, salary, commission, or any payment in kind: including
doing paid apprenticeship, domestic work or paid farm work,
excluding ganyu, even if only for one hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
In the last 12 months, did you engage in casual, part-time
or ganyu labour, even if only for one hour?
1 = Yes; 2 = No
How many hours in the last seven days did you spend
on household agricultural activities (including livestock and
fishing-related activities) whether for sale or for household
food?
Hours
How many hours in the last seven days did you run or do any
kind of non-agricultural or non-fishing household business,
big or small, for yourself?
Hours
How many hours in the last seven days did you help in any
of the household’s non-agricultural or non-fishing household
businesses, if any?
Hours
How many hours in the last seven days did you engage in
casual, part-time or ganyu labour?
Hours
How many hours in the last seven days did you do any work





4G. Stability of the Coefficients
Following the discussion in Appendix 3F, Table 4.A6 provides robustness test for
the relative deprivation proxies. Table 4.A6 reports the bias-adjusted coefficients
using Rmax = 0.3 for different values of δ. For the determination of the robustness
of the coefficients of RD-neighbours and RD-friends the last row, δ = 1, is
of interest. Because the test is only appropriate for linear models, I estimate
the linear probability version of the respective binary models in columns 1 and 3
of Table 4.4. For easy reference I attach the respective coefficient of FISP to the
bias-adjusted estimates in parentheses.
The table shows that the bias-adjusted coefficients RD-friends and RD-
neighbours the same as the Probit estimates of Table 4.4. Hence the regression
estimates in 4.4 may not change significantly even if all relevant omitted variables
were included.
Table 4.A6.: Stability of Coefficients (β) with Varying δ
Delta (δ) value (1) (2)
RD-neighbours RD-friends
β∗ β∗
δ = 0.25 -0.01 -0.02
δ = 0.50 -0.01 -0.02
δ = 0.70 -0.01 -0.02
δ = 1.0 -0.007[-0.01] -0.022[-0.02∗∗∗]
Note: Rmax=.30. [#] Coefficient of RD-neighbours and RD-friends columns 1 and 3







Far from being a recent problem, child labour has been a standing phenomenon
that has engaged the interest of academics, in the fields of economics, history,
sociology etc. (Bhalotra, 2003). Most countries have had to grapple with the
problem at certain times in their history. Today, child labour presents a real
threat to human capital development and the fight against poverty in developing
countries. Child labour is multifaceted in all its aspects and therefore requires
a thorough understanding to prescribe effective solutions. The aim of the thesis
has been to explore some less studied causes of child labour in SSA to provide
further insights into the main determinants of child labour in the sub-region. I
employed empirical analysis using data sets from two African countries – Malawi
and Uganda.
The central questions considered in the work are: (i) What is the impact
of changes in food prices on child labour? (ii) What is the child-labour effect of
agricultural input subsidies designed to combat higher food prices and low food
production? and finally (iii) How does relative deprivation affect child labour
in Africa? These set of questions address aspects of the three central themes
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in discussions concerning the causes of child labour: constraints, incentives, and
agency. The constraint aspect is expressed through the relationship between food
prices and household income/poverty within the context of Africa where most
of the population are farmers. On incentives, I argue that input subsidies could
motivate households to engage in child labour by increasing the marginal product
of the child’s time on the farm. Relative deprivation poverty could also induce
both constraints and agency problems.
Farming and other agriculture-related activities remain the main economic
activity for more than half of the people in SSA. In most cases, however, these
people are small-scale farmers, who barely produce enough for household con-
sumption. A majority of the people are, therefore, net-consumers who spend a
sizeable proportion of their income on food. Therefore, when food prices increase,
these people face a real threat to their livelihoods and subsistence. Chapter 2 of
this thesis examined the impact of higher food prices on the household supply
of child labour. The chapter argues that higher food prices present both chal-
lenges and opportunities to farm households in Africa. The ability or not to take
advantage of high food prices depends, among other factors, on the household’s
ownership of land, access to credit, a well-functioning labour market, and the time
horizon.
As a contribution of this thesis, Chapter 2 analyses the effect of food prices
on child labour by taking into consideration some factors that could moderate the
observed effect. The study was designed to show the potential effect of a short-
term shock on child labour and consequently the future potentials of the child. We
used three rounds of a panel data from Uganda in this study. The main finding
in Chapter 2 is that an increase in the price of the average basket of food leads to
a significant increase child labour. The effect, as expected, is found to be higher
among households that live below the poverty line. We also noticed that children
in landowning farm households are less affected in terms of the probability that
they would engage in child labour.
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There are two channels through which changes in food prices could affect
child labour in the context of a small developing economy like Uganda. These
are the expenditure and the income effects. The income effect suggests that a
higher price could increase the income of farm households, and thus, the ability
to afford education/leisure of their children. However, due to the labour market
imperfections, the higher prices which increase the value of marginal product
could further induce household labour demand leading to more child labour. If
the second channel of the income effect was true, we would expect child labour to
be higher among farming households that own land. However, two results from
Chapter 2 do not support these channels; (i) the total effect is positive, and (ii) the
effect tends to be lower for landowning-farm households. Hence the most plausible
reason for the results of the study is that the expenditure effect dominates the
income effect, which means that households may be using the income from child
labour to supplement income.
Theoretically, the chapter lends towards Basu and Van (1998) who argue
that income/poverty constraint is the main cause of child labour. Empirically,
whilst the study is corroborated by the result of Hou et al. (2015) and Bibi et
al. (2010), our findings differ from the results of Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006)
and Alessie, Baker, Blundell, Heady, and Meghir (1992) who find that the income
effect of a higher price of rice (Vietnam) and cocoa (Côte D’Ivoire), respectively,
dominates than the substitution effect.
The complex nature of child labour in terms of both causes and effects
means that most public policies may directly or indirectly have an impact on
child labour (Bhalotra, 2003). Indeed, the effect of public programmes on child
labour has inspired several theoretical and empirical studies in development eco-
nomics (see Dammert, de Hoop, Mvukiyehe, and Rosati (2017) for a survey of the
literature). Following this strand of the literature, Chapter 3 examined the effect
of an agricultural input subsidy program on child labour in Africa.
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The topic of Chapter 3 was selected to show how a policy response to food
price surges could have an unintended effect on child labour if not planned and
implemented well. Using an individual level panel data from Malawi, I show in this
chapter that agricultural input (fertilizer and improved maize varieties) subsidy
could have a significant effect on child labour. The major findings of this study
are (i) children from households that receive subsidized inputs are more likely to
engage in child labour. The results are significant for both agricultural work and
non-agricultural work. The chapter further shows that children, as young as 5 to
13 years, may be involved in farm activities like land preparation, weeding and
fertilizer application.
Considering the significant effect of the program on child labour, if policy
makers do not make a deliberate attempt to make the program more sensitive to
child labour, the future of the children in recipient households may be adversely
affected. Relating child labour to its effects on educational outcomes and human
capital development, the results of the study suggests that even though there may
be a marginal increase in the incomes of poor farm households in the interim, these
households have a potential risk of living under a vicious cycle of poverty because
future members may not be very productive. There could be health implications,
especially for the young children who directly work in the application of chemical
fertilizers. A way to mitigate the child-labour effect of the programme is to
select program beneficiaries based on desirable academic indicators like school
enrolment and retention, and most importantly, the performance of the school-
going child in the households. This will not only ensure that the immediate aims
of the program are achieved, but it will also guarantee the future of these children
and by extension the ability of their households to escape poverty in the long run.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I evaluate the effect of subjective poverty on child
labour. In this chapter subjective poverty is measured by the self-assessed com-
parison between the household on the one hand, and its friends and neighbours
on the other hand. Very often economists model child labour as a function of
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absolute poverty/income or their correlates. However, emerging evidence shows
that household decisions on resources allocation and child labour may depend on
factors other than monetary poverty. This may explain why child labour seems
to persist despite a reduction in absolute poverty in some countries. The chapter
bears direct relevance to the central theme of the thesis since both food price
shocks and the distribution of input subsidies could have a direct impact on sub-
jective poverty.
The results show that children from households that feel poor compared to
their friends and neighbours are more likely to engage in child labour. We further
find that the effect of subjective poverty is lower among households that are richer
in monetary terms. In the broader theme of this thesis, the observed results in
Chapter 4 could re-enforce the effect of higher food prices and the input subsidy
program. For instance, Alem and Köhlin (2014) find that higher food price could
reduce subjective well-being. This means that aside from the direct impact of
higher food prices on child labour, it effects on subjective well-being could worsen
the child labour problem in the affected countries. In a similar vein, Chirwa et
al. (2011) find that the input subsidy program in Malawi has a significant effect
on subjective well-being such that households which receive the inputs consider
themselves well-off in comparison to non-recipient household. Thus, by extension,
their results further show how distributing inputs to political cronies and the
already worthy farmers could further worsen child labour.
5.2. Policy Implications
The findings of this study have policy implications in terms of the design and im-
plementation of mitigating measures against food price changes and agricultural
policies in general. To begin, the results show that the effects of higher food prices
go beyond its immediate impact on expenditure and by extension poverty level.
The thesis has demonstrated that households, in addition to other things, may
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increase the supply of child labour because of higher food prices. The results of
Chapter 2, therefore, is supported by other empirical findings that income from
child labour constitutes a significant proportion of household income, especially
in times of adverse economic shocks. The bigger question, therefore, is whether
a total ban on child labour will enhance or further diminish the welfare of house-
holds in such times. In situations like this different policy options are available,
and each choice must be weighed vis-a-viz the pro and cons. For some of these
children and their families, a total ban on child labor will significantly reduce
household income such that these children may have to drop out of school. In this
case, policymakers must devise instruments that will optimise children’s education
without necessarily putting a total ban on child labour.
The first policy option is based on the luxury axiom of Basu and Van
(1998). Policy makers could give subsidies and tax rebates that ensure that food
prices are within the reach of the poor and the vulnerable. This will ensure that
the higher food prices do not cause household consumption to fall below the level
of subsistence. However, apart from the high cost to the already constrained gov-
ernment budget, such a policy may not be very effective, and may not provide a
lasting solution. Indeed, some countries in SSA adopted variants of this option
with varying degrees of success. However, assessments of their effectiveness in
protecting poor households against food price hikes has shown that such an ap-
proach has been less effective. The ineffectiveness is attributed to the fact that
such subsidies did not target the right households and food items (World Bank,
2012). Thus, given the findings of Chapter 2, Bibi et al. (2010) and Hou (2015),
one can conclude that this approach may not be an effective option in combating
the child-labour effects of increased food prices. Targeted food subsidies could
even worsen child labour among poor households because of the price distortions
that may be associated with it. Such subsidies usually affect imported cereals to
the disadvantage of locally produced staples, hence the demand for the products
of small-scale farmers may even fall due to the subsidies.
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The foregoing means that some factors must be considered if subsidies to
curb the effect of food prices on child labour are to be effective. It is important
that policy markers pay attention to the heterogeneous effects of the problem.
The analysis shows that landless-agricultural households, and poor households,
in general, are more likely to suffer the child-labour consequences of a food price
surge. As a result, food subsidies should target food items that constitute the
average basket of poor households. This would ensure that households who benefit
from the policy are those who really need it. Even with this, governments should
ensure that the relative prices of domestically produced goods do not increase
excessively since this may re-enforce the child-labour effect of higher food prices.
Another popular policy option entail providing subsidized inputs to farmers
as a lasting solution to curb the re-occurring food price shocks and low produc-
tion (Abbott & de Battisti, 2011). The effect of this on child labour was studied
in Chapter 3. The chapter argued that if the market for agricultural labour is
underdeveloped or does not exist in most SSA countries, the provision of subsi-
dized input to poor farmers may be a potential source of increased child labour.
This assertion is shown by the results of the empirical analysis. The fact that
even relatively richer farmers (those who cultivate more than 2 acres of land)
tend to engage in child labour when they receive inputs shows that unless labour
saving inputs are also provided, the mere provision of labour-augmenting inputs
like fertilizer and improved seeds could worsen the child labour situation among
small-scale farmers. To reduce the child-labour effects of the input subsidies,
two policy directives are deduced from the findings of Chapter 3. First, the gov-
ernment could ban the use of child labour among beneficiary farmers. However,
this option is likely to fail since the evidence shows that such laws and regula-
tions have largely failed to eliminate child labour. In this case, regulation may be
difficult to endorse because of the agency problem. It will be difficult to expect
adult household members/parents who demand the services of the children on
farms to respect this directive in the absence of an external monitor/supervisor.
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Aside, this policy option raises the debated question of whether a total ban on
child labour will enhance or diminish the welfare of these households. From all
indications, farm households may suffer significant welfare losses if there were a
total ban on child labour.
However, I tend to favour a second alternative which can present a situation
where everyone benefits, the household achieves sustainable livelihood without
negatively affecting the child’s human development. This is to condition subsidies,
cash transfers and input, on desirable outcomes like school enrolment, and if
possible, the academic performance of the children. The added-advantage of this
alternative is that such outcomes are easily verifiable at a minimal extra cost to the
subsidy program. Prospective beneficiaries could be asked to present the report
cards of their wards as a condition precedent to subsequent benefits. This could
also solve the agency problem since the schooling outcomes of the child become
part of the immediate needs of the households. Parents may, therefore, make
efforts to ensure that the type of tasks allocated to children are age appropriate
and do not interfere with the educational progress of the child.
5.3. Suggestions for Future Research
This dissertation has analysed the effects of recent economic happenings in SSA
on child labour. The analysis and results of the dissertation suggest possibilities
for additional research. In Chapter 2, our findings suggest that food prices have a
positive effect on the incidence of child labour. The first policy-relevant question
from these results is, what are available means to reduce the child labour impact
of higher food prices. Theoretically, Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2014) suggests that
direct cash transfer may be an effect policy to reduce child labour among poor
households. However, even though the effect of direct cash transfers on child
labour has been studied, to the best of my knowledge there has no empirical
study that tests the proposition of this theory in the face of economic shocks like
143
Chapter 5. General Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Further Research
the 2008 food price hikes. It will, therefore, be worthwhile for future research
to study the efficacy of direct cash transfers as means to eliminate the effect of
higher food prices on child labour.
The effect of food price changes on child labour has been the subject of
different research studies for a long time. The results from these studies, including
ours in Chapter 2, show conflicting results. A clear limitation of our study is the
focus on a single country. This is partly due to time and cross-country data
constraints. Further evidence from different developing countries may, therefore,
help to see how the results of our study generalize. This will be particularly helpful
in policy making in Africa where the heterogeneous nature of the countries makes
it very difficult to generalize results from one country.
To provide an assured means to cope with changes in food prices, it will be
interesting to know if households are willing to buy an insurance policy against
food price shocks. Therefore, research in this regard to ascertain the willingness
to buy an insurance policy of this kind could provide valuable information for our
ability to design effective policies to deal with future occurrence of the problem.
In Chapter 3, we show that children in input receiving households are
more likely to engage in child labour than their counterparts in households that
did not receive any inputs. However, another study suggests that school enrolment
tends to be higher among children in recipient households. In the context of an
African country, these conflicting results are not surprising since children normally
combine schooling and some form of work to support their family and to take
care of their school bills. However, these results provide the basis for research
into the academic performance of these children. Indeed, school enrolment does
not necessarily lead to better performance and higher achievement neither does
child labour necessarily result in poor academic performance, therefore, such a
study will help provide the missing link between the policy and human capital
development of the children in these countries.
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We also find evidence of children engaging in fertilizer application. We
argue that such children stand the risk of chemical absorption. If our assertion
is true, then this has serious health consequences for these children. However, a
study of the actual chemical effect of the policy on children falls beyond the scope
of this work. The results, however, suggests the need for a more comprehensive
study on the level of chemical contamination suffered by these children and health
implication associated with their handling of chemical fertilizer.
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